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A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MODEL 
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR 
MEDIATORS (2005): CALL FOR REFORM 
OMER SHAPIRA* 
The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators (2005), which were devel-
oped and adopted by leading organizations in the field of mediation, were de-
signed to serve as fundamental ethical guidelines for persons mediating in all 
practice contexts, inform mediating parties, and promote public confidence in 
mediation as a process for resolving disputes.  
The Model Standards have proved to be an influential ethical source for 
mediators, mediation scholars, and legislatures.  They have inspired many 
codes of conduct for mediators in the United States and abroad and influenced 
their content.  Many commentators and mediators treat them as an authorita-
tive statement on the ethical conduct expected of mediators. 
Over the years, commentators have raised concerns about some aspects of 
the Model Standards, for example, their failure to adequately guide mediators 
in situations of competing values, and the vagueness of their substantive provi-
sions.  No work to date has exposed the Model Standards to a systematic and 
comprehensive assessment, which is necessary for an evaluation of their ade-
quacy as a coherent statement of the fundamental ethical guidelines for medi-
ators, and for the development of a viable alternative to them.  Ten years after 
the adoption of the revised Model Standards in 2005, this Article comes to fill 
the gap in the literature and open the discussion on the next version of the 
Model Standards. 
The Article argues that the Model Standards are in need of reform, points 
to key issues that should be addressed in reforming them, and calls for a re-
newed debate over the shape, content, and vision of the Model Standards. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators (2005) (hereinafter Model 
Standards) were designed to serve as fundamental ethical guidelines for per-
sons mediating in all practice contexts, inform mediating parties, and promote 
public confidence in mediation as a process for resolving disputes.1  They were 
developed and adopted for the first time in 1994 by three leading organizations 
in the field of mediation: the American Arbitration Association, the American 
Bar Association’s Section of Dispute Resolution, and the Society of Profession-
als in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR)—now the Association for Conflict Resolu-
tion.2  The 1994 version was revised in 2005 and replaced by the current Model 
Standards.3 
The Model Standards have proved to be an influential ethical source for 
mediators, mediation scholars, and legislatures.  In both their old and revised 
versions, they have inspired many codes of conduct for mediators in the United 
 
* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Ono Academic College.  Parts of this Article have been presented 
at the AALS Alternative Dispute Resolution Section’s 9th Annual Works-in-Progress Conference held 
in Texas A&M University School of Law in October 23–24, 2015.  I would like to thank the partici-
pants of that conference for their comments. 
1. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS pmbl. (AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, AM. 
BAR ASS’N, AND ASS’N FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION 2005) [hereinafter MODEL STANDARDS]. 
2.  Id. at intro., n.1. 
3.  Id. at intro. 
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States and abroad and influenced their content.4  They were, in general, warmly 
welcomed by mediation scholars.5  One commentator has recently suggested 
that the Model Standards are “the most authoritative mediator ethical code in 
the United States.”6  Another commentator observed that “[t]he Standards have 
assumed a Talmudic status in a field eager for direction.  Like the Bible, Quran, 
or other holy texts, the Standards serve as the textual touchstone for virtually 
every argument regarding what mediation is or should be.”7  
The importance of the Model Standards has been enhanced in a reality in 
which mediation is for the most part left unregulated.  Thousands of mediators 
across the United States and abroad, especially in private settings, are not sub-
ject to any applicable ethical code which governs their actions.8  In the absence 
of applicable codes, these mediators are likely to turn to the Model Standards, 
which stand out as a shining example of an authoritative statement on the con-
duct expected of mediators.9  
Over the years, however, commentators have raised concerns about some 
aspects of the revised Model Standards.  Michael L. Moffitt, for example, has 
drawn attention to their failure to adequately guide mediators in situations of 
competing values.10  Similarly, Laura E. Weidner noted that the revised Model 
Standards, like the 1994 version, fail to guide mediators on the way to deal with 
 
4. See, e.g., MICHIGAN STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (MICH. STATE COURT 
ADMIN. OFFICE 2013), http://www.courts.mi.gov/Administration/SCAO/Resources/Documents/
standards/odr/Mediator%20Standards%20of%20Conduct%202.1.13.pdf [https://perma.cc/V34E-
V6E4]; ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR MEDIATORS (LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTL. 2011), http://www.law-
council.asn.au/lawcouncil/images/LCA-PDF/a-z-docs/EthicalGuidelinesforMediators.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5QPG-PMWG] (Australian Ethical Guidelines); A GUIDE FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEE 
MEDIATORS (FED.  INTERAGENCY ADR WORKING GRP. STEERING COMM. 2006), http://
www.adr.gov/pdf/final_manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EK4-XUGH] [hereinafter FEDERAL 
EMPLOYEE MEDIATORS GUIDE]; Andrea C. Yang, Ethics Codes for Mediator Conduct: Necessary but 
Still Insufficient, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1229, 1239–42 (2009) (discussing state ethics codes which 
implemented the MODEL STANDARDS in various forms and degrees). 
5. Laura E. Weidner, Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 547, 565 (2006); Yang, supra note 4, at 1236 (discussing the positive reception of the MODEL 
STANDARDS); Paula M. Young, Rejoice! Rejoice! Rejoice, Give Thanks, and Sing: ABA, ACR, and 
AAA Adopt Revised Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 5 APPAL. J. L. 195, 195 (2006). 
6. Michael T. Colatrella, Jr., Informed Consent in Mediation: Promoting Pro Se Parties’ In-
formed Settlement Choice While Honoring the Mediator’s Ethical Duties, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 705, 709 (2014). 
7. MEDIATION ETHICS: CASES AND COMMENTARIES 10 (Ellen Waldman ed., 2011) [hereinafter 
MEDIATION ETHICS]. 
8. Id.   
9. See, e.g., id.   
10. See, e.g., Michael L. Moffitt, The Wrong Model, Again: Why the Devil is Not in the Details 
of the New Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 12 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 31, 31–32 (2006). 
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imbalance of power situations while observing their obligation to maintain im-
partiality.11  Andrea C. Yang has noted that most criticism of the Model Stand-
ards focuses on the vagueness of their substantive provisions.12  Kimberlee K. 
Kovach, for example, criticized their treatment of honesty in mediation;13 Susan 
Nauss Exon pointed out the vague nature of the Model Standards’ provisions 
relating to mediator impartiality and fairness;14 Michael T. Colatrella, Jr. dis-
cussed the Model Standards’ shortcomings regarding informed consent;15 and 
Paul Springer evaluated their approach to advertising.16 
The critique of the Model Standards has been sporadic, focusing on partic-
ular and isolated aspects of them.  My research of the literature has found no 
work that has exposed the Model Standards to a systematic and comprehensive 
assessment,17 which is, in my view, necessary if we are to evaluate their ade-
quacy as a coherent statement of the “fundamental ethical guidelines for per-
sons mediating in all practice contexts,”18 and if we are to develop a viable 
alternative to them.  Ten years after the adoption of the revised Model Stand-
ards, this Article comes to fill this gap in the literature and open the discussion 
on the next version of the Model Standards. 
This Article argues that the Model Standards are in need of reform, points 
to key issues that should be addressed in reforming them, and calls for a re-
newed debate over the shape, content, and vision of the Model Standards.  It 
does not offer a comprehensive and detailed proposal for New Model Stand-
ards, a task which cannot be accomplished within the limited scope of an arti-
cle, and which I have undertaken elsewhere.19   
Part II discusses seven major conceptual changes that the Model Standards 
should undergo.  Section A argues that the definition of mediation in the Model 
 
11. Weidner, supra note 5, at 566. 
12. Yang, supra note 4, at 1237.  
13. Kimberlee K. Kovach, Musing on Idea(l)s in the Ethical Regulation of Mediators: Honesty, 
Enforcement, and Education, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 123, 127, 135–37 (2005). 
14. Susan Nauss Exon, How Can A Mediator Be Both Impartial and Fair?: Why Ethical Stand-
ards of Conduct Create Chaos for Mediators, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 387, 393, 395–406 (2006).  
15. Colatrella, supra note 6, at 710–11. 
16. Paul Springer, Avoiding the Full Court Press: Amending the ABA Model Standards of Con-
duct to Better Regulate Mediator Advertising, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 901, 901 (2014).  
17. For an appraisal of the 1994 version of the MODEL STANDARDS, see Jamie Henikoff & Mi-
chael Moffitt, Remodeling the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
87, 87 (1997).  
18.  MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at pmbl. 
19. See OMER SHAPIRA, A THEORY OF MEDIATORS’ ETHICS: FOUNDATIONS, RATIONALE, AND 
APPLICATION (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2016). 
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Standards is wrong in mixing descriptive and normative features.20  This Arti-
cle calls for the adoption of a factual definition which states what mediation is, 
not what mediation ought to be. 
Section B criticizes the Model Standards’ statement of the purposes of me-
diation.  This statement suits problem-solving mediation, but does not fit other 
mediation styles.21  This Article argues that the Model Standards should apply 
to mediation styles other than problem-solving mediation and should state so 
explicitly.  
Section C argues that the levels of guidance “shall” and “should,” which 
the Model Standards use to guide mediators, are used inconsistently and some-
times in a wrong way.22  Furthermore, this Article draws attention to a third 
level of guidance—“may”—which the Model Standards use without proper ex-
planation.  
Section D claims that although the Model Standards implicitly recognize 
that mediators owe duties beyond their duties toward the parties, they fail to 
state so openly and clarify those additional duties.23  As a result, mediators re-
ceive a partial and inaccurate picture of their ethical obligations, which under-
mines their ability to engage in an ethical practice of mediation.  This Article 
argues that the Model Standards should expressly state that mediators owe du-
ties toward the profession, the public, and courts or referring bodies, as well as 
duties toward the parties.  It further argues that such a change could have a 
significant effect on the way mediators understand their role, exercise discre-
tion, and practice mediation ethically.   
Section E focuses on the inadequate guidance offered by the Model Stand-
ards on the conduct expected of mediators in the event that particular standards 
conflict, and suggests that a clarification is in place.24  Section F argues that the 
nine-standard architecture of the Model Standards needs to be revised to in-
clude new Standards of Diligence, Honesty, Respect, Professional Integrity, 
and Fairness.25  This Article shows that some aspects of the proposed standards 
are partially, yet inadequately, covered by the current Standard of Quality of 
the Process.  It argues, however, that the Standard of Quality of the Process 
should be deconstructed, its content broadened, and the Model Standards re-
structured to include the newly proposed standards.  
Section G challenges the common assumption that the Model Standards do 
 
20. See infra Section II.A. 
21. See infra Section II.B. 
22. See infra Section II.C. 
23. See infra Section II.D. 
24. See infra Section II.E. 
25. See infra Section II.F. 
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not hold mediators accountable for mediation outcomes.26  This Article sug-
gests that the Model Standards’ guidance on the process of mediation could be 
interpreted as an implied and partial (although far from satisfying) recognition 
of mediator accountability for outcomes, illustrating this point with regard to 
uninformed and illegal outcomes.  This Article calls for amending the Model 
Standards to offer a higher degree of accountability for mediation outcomes, 
consistent with other codes of conduct for mediators and in line with supportive 
comments of mediation experts.   
Part III focuses on the content of particular standards, identifying weak-
nesses in some of them that require attention.  Section A argues that the Stand-
ard of Self-determination should be revised in order to improve its guidance on 
the allocation of decision-making power between the parties and the mediator.27  
It further argues that the standard should incorporate party competency as a 
component of self-determination, and should attach more weight to informed 
consent.  
Section B claims that if the Standard of Impartiality is to be taken seriously 
as a realistic normative guide for mediator conduct, it needs to be redrafted in 
order to properly address explicit bias or prejudice (to be distinguished from 
implicit bias), make perceived partiality (or the appearance of partiality) subject 
to a test of reasonableness, acknowledge the appearance of partiality as a 
ground for declining a case and withdrawal, and provide for legitimate in-
stances of favoritism that address the need for mediators to treat parties differ-
ently during a mediation.28  
Section C argues that the Standard of Conflicts of Interest offers an incom-
plete definition of conflicts of interest, which ignores the possibility that the 
mediator preferred his own interest over the interests of all parties.29  In addi-
tion, it is argued that the rationale for serious conflicts of interest which the 
parties cannot legitimize should be clarified and made explicit in the phrasing 
of the standard.  
Section D maintains that the Standard of Competence does not adequately 
define competence, and sends a wrong, subjective message on the level of com-
petence required of mediators, inconsistent with the Reporter’s Notes on com-
petence.30 
Section E argues that the grounds for permitted disclosure listed by the 
 
26. See infra Section II.G. 
27. See infra Section III.A. 
28. See infra Section III.B. 
29. See infra Section III.C. 
30. See infra Section III.D. 
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Standard of Confidentiality should be qualified with a reminder to mediators 
that disclosures, notwithstanding the parties’ agreement, must be consistent 
with the other standards.31  It further argues that the standard should be amended 
to include a reference to a mediator’s responsibility to make certain that parties 
understand the extent to which the mediator will maintain the confidentiality of 
information that surfaces in mediation.32 
Part IV concludes the Article, calling upon the ADR community to start a 
process of reforming the Model Standards.33 
II. CONCEPTUAL CRITIQUE OF THE MODEL STANDARDS 
The greatest weakness of the Model Standards goes unnoticed.  The stand-
ards were “designed to serve as fundamental ethical guidelines for persons me-
diating in all practice contexts,”34 but the theory that informs these ethical 
guidelines and justifies them is nowhere to be found.  What is the Model Stand-
ards’ ethical source of authority?  Why should we accept the Model Standards 
as an authoritative statement of the ethical obligations of mediators?  Why 
should mediators, who are not members of the three organizations that have 
formally adopted the Model Standards, treat them as an authoritative statement 
of the ethical obligations of mediators?  Why, for example, do the Model Stand-
ards consist of nine standards and not sixteen?  Why these nine standards and 
not others?  And how can we be sure that the content of the standards is correct 
and accurate? 
Neither the Model Standards nor the Reporter’s Notes that accompany them 
answer these questions.  Without adequate answers, the Model Standards’ au-
thority is undermined, and their structure and content open to a charge of arbi-
trariness.  What the Model Standards lack is a theory that supports and justifies 
them.  What they fail to provide is a method to identify the ethical obligations 
of mediators and ascertain their particular content.  
I believe it is possible to construct a theory that justifies a set of ethical 
standards that applies to all mediators.35  This, however, is not the focus of this 
Article, which is designed to offer a critical reading of the Model Standards, 
demonstrate some of their deficiencies, call for reform, and suggest key points 
on the road to reform.  The following sections undertake that task. 
   
 
31. See infra Section III.E. 
32. See infra Section III.E. 
33. See infra Part IV. 
34. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at pmbl. (emphasis added). 
35. See SHAPIRA, supra note 19, at ch. 3. 
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A. An Inadequate Definition of Mediation: Mixing Descriptive and 
Normative Features 
The Model Standards define mediation as “a process in which an impartial 
third party facilitates communication and negotiation and promotes voluntary 
decision making by the parties to the dispute.”36  For the most part it is a fine 
definition because its wording can capture, in my view, the main types or ori-
entations of mediation, most notably problem-solving mediation (including fa-
cilitative and evaluative styles of mediation), transformative mediation, and 
narrative mediation.37  These types of mediation,38 despite their differences, ex-
hibit several fundamental features which any mediation process shares: (1) a 
third party, (2) who assists parties to a dispute, (3) to communicate and make 
voluntary decisions.  True, one would be correct to observe that a problem-
solver mediator will be more outcome-oriented and use the language and tools 
of needs and interests, a transformative mediator more process-oriented, seek-
ing to empower the parties and bring about recognition shifts,39 and a narrative 
mediator more fixed on the relationship between the parties, seeking to decon-
struct the conflict stories and help the parties to develop an alternative narra-
tive;40 however, whether one is a problem-solver, transformative, or narrative 
mediator, the core of one’s practice is helping parties in a dispute to communi-
cate and make voluntary decisions.41  In this sense, therefore, the Model Stand-
ards are on the right track. 
The difficulty with the Model Standards’ definition of mediation is its de-
scription of the third party as impartial, thereby making impartiality a compo-
nent of the process definition.  This is wrong because no one seriously argues 
that when a mediator is not impartial the process he is conducting is not in fact 
a mediation.42  Impartiality is a normative concept, which the Model Standards 
 
36. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at pmbl. 
37. See, e.g., MEDIATION ETHICS, supra note 7, at 19–24 (treating these styles, in effect, as the 
main styles of mediation). 
38. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: 
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994) (discussing trans-
formative mediation); Kimberlee K. Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins: Transforming Law-
yer Ethics for Effective Representation in A Non-Adversarial Approach to Problem Solving: Media-
tion, 28 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 935, 942 (2001) (discussing problem solving mediation); JOHN 
WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, NARRATIVE MEDIATION: A NEW APPROACH TO CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION (2000) (discussing narrative mediation). 
39. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 38, at 89–94; TRANSFORMATIVE MEDIATION: A SOURCEBOOK 
25–26 (Joseph P. Folger et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter TRANSFORMATIVE MEDIATION].  
40. WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 38, at 38, 82. 
41. MEDIATION ETHICS, supra note 7, at 18.  
42. On the difference between a descriptive definition of mediation that factually describes me-
diation practice, and a normative definition of mediation that describes what mediation ought to look 
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further develop in a Standard of Impartiality.43  According to the norm of im-
partiality, mediators have a normative obligation to conduct mediations impar-
tially, and if they fail to do so they are conducting the mediation in a norma-
tively wrong way.  While the three elements of the definition of mediation 
mentioned above are factual and necessary for any mediation process to exist, 
impartiality, like other common norms of mediation such as confidentiality and 
conflicts of interest, is a normative standard that mediators are expected to fol-
low, and a failure on their part to do so does not strip the process of its mediation 
title.44  The definition of mediation in the Model Standards therefore should not 
include a reference to the impartiality of the mediator, though impartiality 
should continue to be one of the standards applicable to mediators.  
B. An Outdated Statement on the Purposes of Mediation: Moving 
Beyond Problem-Solving Mediation 
The Model Standards accompany the definition of mediation with a state-
ment on the purposes of mediation.  It provides that “[m]ediation serves various 
purposes, including providing the opportunity for parties to define and clarify 
issues, understand different perspectives, identify interests, explore and assess 
possible solutions, and reach mutually satisfactory agreements, when de-
sired.”45  Mediators who belong to the problem-solving school of mediation, 
both facilitative and evaluative, will probably feel comfortable with this list of 
purposes and its reference to the language of issues, interests, and options.  
However, a growing number of mediators who have a transformative or narra-
tive orientation are likely to find it partial and unsatisfactory.  Transformative 
mediators, for example, will probably want to add the goals of empowering 
disputants,46 recognition (helping parties to connect to the other),47 and the 
transformation of “conflict interaction from destructive and demonizing to pos-
itive and humanizing.”48  And narrative mediators will add to the goals of me-
diation the deconstruction of the conflict stories of the parties49 and the con-
struction of an alternative story of cooperation that will allow the parties to 
cooperate with each other.50  
 
like, see, for example, Michael L. Moffitt, Schmediation and the Dimensions of Definition, 10 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 69, 79–89 (2005) (discussing prescriptive and descriptive definitions of mediation).  
43.  MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard II. 
44. See Moffitt, supra note 42, at 79–89. 
45. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at pmbl. 
46. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 38, at 85; TRANSFORMATIVE MEDIATION, supra note 39, at 25. 
47. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 38, at 92; TRANSFORMATIVE MEDIATION, supra note 39, at 25. 
48. TRANSFORMATIVE MEDIATION, supra note 39, at 26. 
49. See WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 38, at 38. 
50. See id. at 82. 
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The Model Standards do not state that they are intended for the guidance of 
problem-solving mediators alone.  On the contrary, some comments in the Re-
porter’s Notes to the Model Standards suggest that they are aimed at other me-
diation styles as well.  Already in 2005, the Reporter’s Notes noted:  
Since the publication of the 1994 Version, there has been sig-
nificant academic and policy discussion focused on mediation 
style or theory.  In particular, the terms, facilitative and evalu-
ative, to describe mediator orientations have taken on particu-
lar meanings in the popular literature and approaches to medi-
ation differently conceptualized in such frameworks as 
problem-solving or transformative have been trenchantly ana-
lyzed.  The revised definition of mediation is not designed to 
exclude any mediation style or approach consistent with 
Standard I’s commitment to support and respect the parties’ 
decision-making roles in the process.51  
Since the adoption of the revised Model Standards in 2005, the transform-
ative and narrative styles have further developed and gained recognition.  For 
example, Ellen Waldman’s casebook on mediation ethics discusses these styles 
of mediation practice alongside the problem-solving style as representing the 
current field of mediation.52  Thus, the purposes of transformative and narrative 
mediation should be explicitly recognized in a reformed version of the Model 
Standards.  Alternatively, the “various purposes of mediation” paragraph 
should be dropped, and a general definition of mediation applicable to all styles 
of mediation as mentioned earlier retained.  
This last point raises, of course, the question whether a single code of con-
duct can apply simultaneously to different styles of mediation.  Some scholars 
have suggested that the differences in style require different codes,53 but no one 
to date has developed this idea beyond making the argument itself.  In fact, to 
 
51. REPORTER’S NOTES (2005), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
2011_build/dispute_resolution/mscm_reporternotes.authcheckdam.pdf, [https://perma.cc/W8LK-
DFDX] (analyzing the MODEL STANDARDS) (emphasis added). 
52. See MEDIATION ETHICS, supra note 7, at 122–24. 
53. See Alison E. Gerencser, Alternative Dispute Resolution Has Morphed into Mediation: 
Standards of Conduct Must Be Changed, 50 FLA. L. REV. 843, 846 (1998) (arguing that states should 
develop specific standards for discrete types of mediation); see also Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency 
and Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition? The Mediator’s Role and Ethical Standards in 
Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REV. 253, 258 (1989) (arguing that different conceptions of mediation support 
different mediator standards); Scott R. Peppet, Contractarian Economics and Mediation Ethics: The 
Case for Customizing Neutrality Through Contingent Fee Mediation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 227, 284 (2003) 
(“On the one hand, mediators need clear ethical rules to guide their behavior. On the other hand, the 
mediation profession is radically heterogeneous. The types of mediations, dispute contexts in which 
mediation is used, and styles of mediation are many. Simple ethical rules will often not apply comfort-
ably across such contexts.”).   
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the best of my knowledge there are no published codes of conduct for mediators 
specifically developed and designed for transformative and narrative mediators.  
It seems to me that the primary goals of the Model Standards—“to guide the 
conduct of mediators; to inform the mediating parties; and to promote public 
confidence in mediation as a process for resolving disputes”54—equally apply 
in the context of transformative and narrative mediation.  I believe that all me-
diators, irrespective of style, are subject to core ethical standards whose content 
may be ascertained, by using role-morality theory and applying it to a core def-
inition of mediators’ role.55  Any mediator, for example, irrespective of style, 
must be competent, respect party self-determination, disclose conflicts of inter-
est, and maintain confidentiality.  It is time that the mediation community dis-
cussed the meaning of these standards from the perspective of each style, in-
corporated them into newly revised Model Standards, and made it clear to 
mediators, mediation parties, and the general public that all mediators, whether 
problem-solvers, transformative, or narrative, are guided by the reformed code.  
C. Misguided Use of Levels of Guidance: Between Shall, Should, and 
May 
The Model Standards’ Note on Construction refers to two levels of guid-
ance for mediator conduct: 
The use of the term “shall” in a Standard indicates that the 
mediator must follow the practice described.  The use of the 
term “should” indicates that the practice described in the stand-
ard is highly desirable, but not required, and is to be departed 
from only for very strong reasons and requires careful use of 
judgment and discretion.56  
However, the use of these terms in the Model Standards is inconsistent and 
the reason for preferring one over the other is unclear.  For example, the Stand-
ard of Impartiality states in section II.B that “[a] mediator shall conduct a me-
diation in an impartial manner,” but then goes on to provide in subsection II.B.1 
that “[a] mediator should not act with partiality or prejudice based on any par-
ticipant’s personal characteristics, background, values and beliefs, or perfor-
mance at a mediation, or any other reason.”57  No explanation is given for the 
variation in guidance, which in fact seems to be mistaken in light of the Re-
porter’s Notes comment on that subsection, which reads:  
 
54.  MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at pmbl. 
55. I develop and defend this argument in SHAPIRA, supra note 19, at ch. 3. 
56. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Note on Construction. 
57. Id. at Standard II.B & II.B.1 (emphasis added). 
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In response to insightful public comment, the Joint Com-
mittee revised the language of what is now Standard II (B)(1) 
to reflect that the mediator must not act in a manner that favors 
or prejudices any mediation participant based on the personal 
characteristics, background, values and beliefs, or performance 
at a mediation of that individual.58 
This inconsistency continues in subsection II.B.2, which provides that “[a] 
mediator should neither give nor accept a gift, favor, loan or other item of value 
that raises a question as to the mediator’s actual or perceived impartiality.”59  
Again, in light of the mandatory requirement in section II.B that the mediator 
“shall conduct a mediation in an impartial manner and avoid conduct that gives 
the appearance of partiality,”60 one would expect the Model Standards to have 
prescribed that a mediator shall “neither give nor accept a gift, favor, loan or 
other item of value that raises a question as to the mediator’s actual or perceived 
impartiality.”61  
This inconsistency can be further illustrated by the choice of terms in other 
standards as well.  The Standard of Confidentiality, for example, states in sec-
tion V.A that “[a] mediator shall maintain the confidentiality of all information 
obtained by the mediator in mediation, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties 
or required by applicable law,”62 but then provides in subsection V.A.2 that “[a] 
mediator should not communicate to any non-participant information about 
how the parties acted in the mediation.  A mediator may report, if required, 
whether parties appeared at a scheduled mediation and whether or not the par-
ties reached a resolution.”63  One could attempt to explain and justify these dif-
ferent levels of guidance by arguing that “information obtained by the media-
tor” is not the same as “information about how the parties acted.”64  However, 
this does not seem to be the Reporter’s Notes understanding of the matter, the 
latter noting that  
some public comments suggested that Standard I [Self-deter-
mination] should contain guidance to a mediator regarding his 
or her duty to report “good faith” participation by various me-
diation participant . . . .  However, in Standard V (A) (2) on 
confidentiality, the Joint Committee explicitly supports the po-
 
58. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 11 (emphasis added). 
59. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard II.B.2 (emphasis added). 
60. Id. at Standard II.B (emphasis added).  
61. Id. at Standard II.B.2. 
62. Id. at Standard V.A (emphasis added). 
63. Id. at Standard V.A.2 (emphasis added). 
64. Id. 
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sition widely adopted in practice and program rules that a me-
diator can override confidentiality, if required, for only two 
purposes: to report whether parties appeared at a scheduled me-
diation or to report whether the parties reached a resolution; 
the Joint Committee rejected overriding the confidentiality re-
quirement for any other purpose.65   
It appears, then, that the Model Standards should have provided that a me-
diator shall not “communicate to any non-participant information about how 
the parties acted in the mediation,” subject to the two mentioned exceptions.66  
These examples of the confusion between shall and should suggest that such a 
distinction is unsupported in the context of the Model Standards and must be 
reconsidered, explained, and applied consistently throughout them.   
Moreover, the Model Standards confusingly use another term of guid-
ance—“may”—without explaining its meaning in their context.  One might 
have thought that if “shall” indicates mandatory conduct and “should” indicates 
a highly recommended conduct that “can be discarded only for compelling rea-
sons,”67 then “may” indicates unguided, free choice on the part of the mediator, 
which requires no justification.  However, in effect even permitted actions or 
decisions require an exercise of professional discretion based on good and rel-
evant reasons.   
For example, the Model Standards provide that “[a] mediator may accept 
or give de minimis gifts or incidental items or services that are provided to fa-
cilitate a mediation or respect cultural norms so long as such practices do not 
raise questions as to a mediator’s actual or perceived impartiality.”68  Despite 
the use of the permissive term “may,” then, it seems that the mediator, as in the 
case of “should” as guidance, is here in fact provided with “strong guidance” 
(to use the language of the Reporter’s Notes69) that requires him to justify his 
actions.  The point I am making here is that conceptually the use of both “may” 
and “should” imposes a burden on the mediator to justify his actions, and the 
Model Standards with their emphasis on the meaning of “should” and disregard 
of the meaning of “may” send a wrong message to mediators.70  In effect, a 
 
65. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 10 (emphasis added). 
66. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard V.A.2. 
67. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 8. 
68. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard II.B.3 (emphasis added). 
69. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 8. 
70. See MCI PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR MEDIATORS (MEDIATION COUNCIL 
OF ILL. 2009), http://www.mediationcouncilofillinois.org/sites/default/
files/MCI%20Professional%20Standards%20of%20Practice_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7KJ-N8BX] 
(“Use of the term ‘may’ in a Standard is the lowest strength of guidance and indicates a practice that 
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mediator may only take an action when that action is consistent with the exer-
cise of his role in accordance with the Model Standards, and this should be 
made clear in them.   
D. A Missing Statement on the Obligations of Mediators: A Need to 
Openly Recognize the Duties toward the Profession, the Public, and 
Courts or Referring Bodies 
The Model Standards “serve as fundamental ethical guidelines” for media-
tors,71 indicating what mediators must and should do in the course of practice.72  
They lay down various obligations of mediators, such as a duty to conduct me-
diation on the basis of party self-determination,73 avoid conflicts of interest,74 
and act with competence.75  Clearly, these obligations are owed to the mediation 
parties.  For example, the Model Standards provide that the parties have a right 
to exercise self-determination in the course of the mediation,76 to know about a 
mediator’s conflict of interest,77 and to be “satisfied with the mediator’s com-
petence and qualifications.”78   
However, mediators have responsibilities other than their obligations to the 
parties.  The Model Standards do not explicitly state that point, but it neces-
sarily follows from some of their provisions.  For example, the Standard of Self-
determination provides that “a mediator may need to balance . . . party self-
determination with a mediator’s duty to conduct a quality process in accordance 
with these Standards.”79  This means that the Model Standards envisage cases 
in which the mediator may act against the wishes of the parties, and unless one 
understands their approach as paternalistic, aimed at protecting the parties from 
themselves, the conclusion must be that the mediator in such cases is discharg-
ing responsibilities to persons or bodies other than the parties.   
This point is made clear by the language of the Standard of Conflicts of 
Interest, which provides in section III.E that “[i]f a mediator’s conflict of inter-
est might reasonably be viewed as undermining the integrity of the mediation, 
 
the mediator should consider adopting but which can be deviated from in the exercise of good profes-
sional judgment.”) (emphasis added) [hereinafter ILLINOIS STANDARDS]. 
71. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at pmbl. 
72. Id. at Note on Construction. 
73. Id. at Standard I.A. 
74. Id. at Standard III.A. 
75. Id. at Standard IV.A. 
76. Id. at Standard I.A. 
77. Id. at Standard III.C.  
78. Id. at Standard IV.A.1. 
79. Id. at Standard I.A.1. 
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a mediator shall withdraw from or decline to proceed with the mediation re-
gardless of the expressed desire or agreement of the parties to the contrary.”80  
In this section, the Model Standards in effect refer to a duty of mediators to 
avoid conduct that “might reasonably be viewed as undermining the integrity 
of the mediation.”  This duty is not aimed at protecting the parties’ interests and 
is not owed to the parties.  Rather, it is designed to protect the process of medi-
ation, reflecting, I would argue, a duty to the profession of mediation and to the 
public.  
Neither the Model Standards nor the Reporter’s Notes bring these obliga-
tions to the forefront, but they are present between the lines.  This explains why, 
for example, the Reporter’s Notes note that the Standard of Impartiality in sec-
tion II.C will not allow the mediator to conduct a mediation if he is unable to 
conduct it in an impartial manner, even if the parties agree that he may pro-
ceed.81 They see the integrity of the process of mediation as an interest of the 
profession and the public that is beyond the parties’ control.82  The Reporter’s 
Notes come close to making such a statement in their comment on the Standard 
of Competence, in which they recognize a mediator responsibility to the public, 
noting that “to promote public confidence in the integrity and usefulness of the 
process and to protect the members of the public, an individual representing 
himself or herself as a mediator must be committed to serving only in those 
situations for which he or she possesses the basic competency to assist.”83   
The Model Standards include other provisions that are phrased in a manner 
indicating that mediators have ethical obligations to protect interests other than 
the parties’.  The Standard of Quality of the Process, for example, provides in 
section VI.A.6 that “[a] mediator shall not conduct a dispute resolution proce-
dure other than mediation but label it mediation in an effort to gain the protec-
tion of rules, statutes, or other governing authorities pertaining to mediation.”84  
It is clear that the purpose of this provision is not to protect the parties, but the 
public.85  The Reporter’s Notes help make this clear, noting that “a mediator 
cannot engage in a ruse of labeling a dispute resolution process as ‘mediation’ 
in order to gain its benefits (such as confidentiality protections) when it is ap-
parent that the participants have designed and participated in some other form 
of dispute resolution.”86  
 
80. Id. at Standard III.E. 
81. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 13. 
82. Id. at 14.  
83. Id. (emphasis added). 
84. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.6. 
85. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 18. 
86. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Similarly, subsection VI.A.9 provides that “[i]f a mediation is being used 
to further criminal conduct, a mediator should take appropriate steps including, 
if necessary, postponing, withdrawing from or terminating the mediation.”87  
The Reporter’s Notes refer to this provision, noting that “it guides a mediator 
who confronts mediation participants using mediation to further criminal con-
duct . . . to take appropriate steps to deter them from accomplishing that goal,”88 
clearly indicating a duty to the public rather than to the parties.   
An explicit recognition of mediator responsibilities other than to the parties 
is not rare in codes of conduct for mediators.  The Code of Professional Conduct 
for Labor Mediators, for example, provides that “[t]hose who engage in the 
practice of mediation . . . must be aware that their duties and obligations relate 
to the parties . . ., to every other mediator, to the agencies which administer the 
practice of mediation, and to the general public.”89  The Australian National 
Mediator Accreditation Standards: Practice Standards provide that “[t]he 
Practice Standards are intended to govern the relationship of mediators with the 
participants in the mediation, their professional colleagues, courts and the gen-
eral public . . . .”90  The Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Me-
diators (hereinafter: Florida Rules) include separate Rules entitled “Mediator’s 
Responsibility to the Parties,”91 “Mediator’s Responsibility to the Mediation 
Profession,”92 “Mediator’s Responsibility to the Mediation Process,”93 and 
“Mediator’s Responsibility to the Courts.”94  And the North Carolina Revised 
Standards of Professional Conduct for Mediators provide that “[p]ersons serv-
ing as mediators are responsible to the parties, the public, and the courts to con-
duct themselves in a manner that will merit that confidence.”95   
 
87.  MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.9. 
88. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 18. 
89. CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT FOR LABOR MEDIATORS pmbl. , 29 C.F.R. pt. 1400 app. (2012), 
http://ethics.iit.edu/ecodes/node/3410 [https://perma.cc/8TEY-KYKX]. 
90. NATIONAL MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION STANDARDS: PRACTICE STANDARDS, Application 
(MEDIATOR STANDARDS BD. 2012), http://www.msb.org.au/sites/default/files/documents/Prac-
tice%20Standards.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TD9-RGRG]. 
91. RULES FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS in ADR RESOURCE 
HANDBOOK 95, R. 10.300, at 105 (FLA. DISPUTE RESOLUTION CTR. 2015), http://www.flcourts.org/
core/fileparse.php/550/urlt/RuleBookletJanuary2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM28-JJAN ] [hereinafter 
FLORIDA RULES]. 
92. Id. at R. 10.600. 
93. Id. at R. 10.400. 
94. Id. at R. 10.500. 
95.  REVISED STANDARDS OF PROF’L CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS pmbl., at 1 (N.C. DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION COMM’N 2011), http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/html/pdf/SOC4_14.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FZ66-D9YR] (adopted by the Supreme Court of North Carolina); see also CAL. R. 
CT. R. 3.850(a) (Revised January 1, 2015), www.courts.ca.gov/cms/rules/index.cfm?title=three 
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The Model Standards, therefore, should indicate in their Preamble to whom 
mediator obligations are owed.  They should declare that the standards reflect 
mediators’ obligations toward the parties, the profession, the public, and to the 
courts or referring agencies when appropriate.  This statement will have to be 
followed by a reassessment of the language of many of the standards, in order 
to ensure that they accurately reflect the multiple obligations of the mediator.  
For example, the Standard of Competence, which currently provides that “[a]ny 
person may be selected as a mediator, provided that the parties are satisfied 
with the mediator’s competence and qualifications,”96 will have to be qualified 
by the obligation to the profession and the public to maintain the integrity of 
the process.97   
I expect these changes to the Model Standards will have far-reaching im-
plications for the way mediators understand their role, exercise discretion, and 
practice mediation ethically.  I will illustrate this point by considering the com-
mentaries to an ethical scenario set in Ellen Waldman’s book on mediation eth-
ics.98  In a nutshell, the scenario involves Ziba and Ahmed, who are an Iranian-
American Muslim couple, living in the United States and in a process of sepa-
ration.99  The wife wants a divorce, the husband objects.100  According to Is-
lamic law and unlike in American law, the divorce cannot proceed without the 
husband’s consent.101  The wife wants to carry out the divorce according to 
Islamic law in order to meet the expectations of the Muslim community which 
she belongs to and wants to stay part of.102  The husband takes advantage of that 
and puts pressure on the wife to accept unfavorable divorce terms according to 
which she will forfeit any right to marriage dissolution payments and any other 
financial support for herself, and also give up custody of their children (aged 
 
[https://perma.cc/DL2A-DKH8] (“Mediators in court-connected programs are responsible to the par-
ties, the public, and the courts for conducting themselves in a manner that merits that confidence.”) 
[hereinafter CALIFORNIA RULES]; TEX. ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR MEDIATORS pmbl. (TEX. SUP. CT. 
2011), http://www.txcourts.gov/All_Archived_Documents/SupremeCourt/AdministrativeOrders/
miscdocket/11/11906200.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ND5-8MJH] (“Mediators should be responsible to the 
parties, the courts and the public, and should conduct themselves accordingly.”) [hereinafter TEXAS 
GUIDELINES]; ILLINOIS STANDARDS, supra note 70, at Definition § E. (‘‘The mediator’s commitment 
shall be to the participants and the process.’’). 
96. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard IV.A.1 (emphasis added). 
97. See infra Section III.D. 
98. MEDIATION ETHICS, supra note 7, at 318. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 319. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 318. 
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two and three) at the age of five.103  The wife capitulates and agrees to the hus-
band’s terms.104   
Two mediation experts, Professor Harold Abramson and Professor Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, have been asked to comment on that scenario.  Interestingly, 
they reach opposite conclusions.105  Abramson is willing to mediate the case, 
while Menkel-Meadow refuses to do so.106  
Abramson’s gravest concern is that the mediator—any Western mediator, 
including himself—will be charged with cultural imperialism, that is, that the 
mediator will impose Westernized values on the parties and replace the parties’ 
values with his or her values.107  His approach reflects the great weight media-
tors traditionally assign to the parties’ wishes and right to self-determination.108  
However, I find his decision to help the parties reach an agreement unconvinc-
ing.   
Abramson’s decision is affected by his view of the role of mediators: “My 
limited role as a mediator who perseveres to honor the principle of party self-
determination becomes clear in this situation.  In the end, all mediators can do 
is conduct a process where the parties can make an informed choice, regardless 
of how personally painful the choice may be to one of the parties and how unfair 
the result may seem to the mediator.”109  Abramson is torn between his values 
and the parties’ choice, but sees no way out that could justify the mediator’s 
withdrawal: “Even in the face of the parties’ consent or apparent consent, the 
mediator may still find the agreement so personally abhorrent as to want to 
withdraw.  But how can a mediator withdraw and avoid the charge of cultural 
imperialism?”110 
He attempts to do so by resorting to what he refers to as “universal interna-
tional norms”:  
As difficult as this was, I tried to put my own personal values 
aside and look instead to see whether working with this couple 
would violate universally accepted international principles of 
human rights.  My inquiries suggest that the answer is no; 
norms surrounding gender equity diverge dramatically 
throughout the world.  This is one of the disturbing facts of 
 
103. Id. at 319. 
104. Id. 
105. Compare id. at 320–27, with id. at 327–35. 
106. Id.  
107. Id. at 334.  
108. Id. at 335.  
109. Id. at 333. 
110. Id. 
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multiculturalism, and as a mediator, I am wary of using my 
own personal views as the yardstick for how the parties should 
structure their affairs.111   
Thus, according to Abramson, the mediator’s source of ethical guidance in 
this Muslim-American couple’s mediation is international law.  He scrutinizes 
the United Nation Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and finds 
that although they declare that men and women have equal rights in marriage 
and its dissolution,112 many Middle Eastern Islamic countries have not ratified 
the convention and even took explicit exception to gender equality.113  He con-
cludes that his “forays into international law revealed no principled source of 
internationally recognized standards that could be the basis for withdrawing 
from the mediation.”114   
I do not find that argument persuasive.  Why should an American mediator, 
mediating a case on American soil between two American citizens who are 
Muslims, all being subject to American law and members of the American pub-
lic, be ethically guided by the decision of Middle Eastern countries to reject 
international treaties on human rights?  I believe that the effort to legitimize the 
parties’ choice at all costs is a reflection of a version of mediation ethics that is 
over-dominated by party self-determination and ignores the fact that mediators 
have other ethical obligations as well.   
In fact, Abramson refers in his comment to such obligations, but does not 
treat them as such or appreciate their implications.  One occasion in which 
Abramson abandons the party self-determination version of mediation ethics is 
where he states that “[i]f both parties want to continue with me and the media-
tion, I think I should try to mediate the best agreement the parties are willing to 
enter into, so long as the agreement is not illegal.”115  Abramson believes, there-
fore, that as a mediator he should not facilitate an illegal agreement no matter 
what the parties want, recognizing that mediators have responsibilities that go 
beyond their duty toward the parties to respect their self-determination.   
Describing the hard choice he faces, Abramson makes another observation 
that hints at mediator obligations toward nonparties that may conflict with the 
parties’ choice:  
I would not want the mediation process (or me) to be associated 
with such an unfair mediated result.  I would want to avoid 
 
111. Id. at 327. 
112. Id. at 333. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 334. 
115. Id. at 335 (emphasis added).   
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conferring the imprimatur of mediation on a process and result 
that violated such a core value of fairness, even when my defi-
nition of fairness was shaped by distinctively Westernized val-
ues.116   
Abramson captures with these comments the idea that mediation is not 
about the relationship between the parties and the mediator alone; a particular 
mediation can have an impact on the way other mediation processes and other 
mediators are publicly perceived; it can have an effect on public confidence in 
the mediation profession and process; and it may influence the willingness of 
potential parties to use mediation in the future to resolve differences.  These 
concerns reflect the relationships of mediators with the profession of mediation 
and the public, establishing an ethical obligation of mediators to conduct medi-
ation in a manner that maintains the standing of the profession and process of 
mediation and public trust in them.117   
Abramson is right to refuse to help the parties reach an illegal agreement.  
An illegal agreement is likely to bring mediation into disrepute, harming the 
standing of mediation and undermining public trust in the profession and pro-
cess of mediation, and as a mediator he has ethical duties toward the public and 
toward the profession of mediation to prevent the harm to the public and the 
profession that would follow from facilitation of an illegal mediated agree-
ment.118  It is, however, difficult to reconcile this responsibility with Abram-
son’s own legal assessment of the case (which is also shared by the other com-
mentator, Menkel-Meadow):119   
Consider the way Ahmed’s power over granting a divorce 
was being used to extort a one-sided agreement, at least from 
a Westernized point of view.  A Western mediator would likely 
view as unfair an agreement where unemployed Ziba waives 
needed financial support and relinquishes rights to her children 
once they turn five.  Under Westernized common law and stat-
utory laws, such a one-sided agreement is also likely to be in-
valid and unenforceable due to Ahmed’s extortionate behavior 
and the duress suffered by Ziba who wants the divorce.120   
Note that the ethical obligation concerning the standing of the institution of 
 
116. Id. 
117. See Omer Shapira, Conceptions and Perceptions of Fairness in Mediation, 54 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 281, 324–27, 329–34 (2012) [hereinafter Fairness]; SHAPIRA, supra note 19, at ch. 3 § 3.7.  
118. See Shapira, Fairness, supra note 117, at 339–40; SHAPIRA, supra note 19, at ch. 8 § 8.2.4.3; 
infra Section II.G.2. 
119. MEDIATION ETHICS, supra note 7, at 323, 326–27. 
120. Id. at 328. 
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mediation and mediators is not confined to illegal outcomes.  This equally ex-
plains why mediators have a duty to prevent an agreement which is not illegal 
yet radically departs from social norms to a degree that could jeopardize public 
faith in the process and profession of mediation.121  This does not mean that a 
mediator may substitute his or her personal notions of fairness and unfairness 
for the parties’, because the mediator’s conception of fairness must be grounded 
in a public conception of fairness, which reflects a norm or perception which is 
external to the mediator.   
The public in the scenario is American society.  It is neither the Muslim 
community in which the parties reside nor the Islamic communities of some 
Middle Eastern countries.  The mediator in the scenario is conducting a dispute 
resolution process in the United States, which he and the parties label “media-
tion.”  As such, this process should be conducted consistent with the norms that 
apply to mediation in the United States.  The conduct of the mediator will be 
evaluated according to these norms and his or her conduct can potentially affect 
his or her fellow American mediators and mediation processes all over the 
United States.  On the facts of the scenario, it seems to me that even if the 
proposed terms of the agreement were not illegal they are extreme to a degree 
that would lead the general public to perceive the mediation as faulty and to 
question the integrity of the mediator.   
Turning to the other commentator, Menkel-Meadow, unlike Abramson, is 
not afraid of being charged with cultural imperialism.  She is convinced and 
openly declares that gender equality is right, and explains that it would be 
wrong for her to mediate the case.122  If the parties came to see her she would 
refer them to a mediator in a specialized religion-based mediation center after 
advising them to seek legal advice about what is necessary for a legal divorce 
in her community.123   
Like Abramson, Menkel-Meadow feels the heavy weight of party self-de-
termination.  She notes, for example, that “some mediators might ask who am 
I to judge what these parties want; in the interest of self-determination, they 
have chosen to be governed by their own religious norms.”124  However, unlike 
Abramson, she has no hesitation rejecting the case: 
I could not, given my own “ethical culture” . . .,  act or be 
“complicit” in an agreement that I felt was legally, morally, or 
ethically wrong . . . in my view, no mediator (and certainly not 
this mediator) should participate in a mediation that she thinks 
 
121. See Shapira, Fairness, supra note 117, at 337–38.  
122. See MEDIATION ETHICS, supra note 7, at 322.  
123. Id. at 320, 326–27. 
124. Id. at 323. 
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will lead to a morally, legally, or ethically “unconscionable” 
result.  What is unconscionable is, of course, subjective, per-
sonal, and nonuniversal.125   
Menkel-Meadow’s analysis of the scenario is clearly much more personal 
than Abramson’s.  In a way, her analysis replaces Abramson’s party self-deter-
mination version of mediation ethics with a more personal, subjective version.  
In Menkel-Meadow’s words:  
For me . . . a mediator is also a party to a mediation, and thus 
the agreement that is reached must also be one that I can be 
accountable and responsible for as a participant in the process.  
My sense of ethics, culture, and yes, even justice is also at 
stake, for I am a party too.126   
I am concerned that mediators who read this account of mediation ethics 
might be tempted to replace the over-dominance of the parties’ wishes in 
Abramson’s account of mediation ethics with an over-dominance of the per-
sonal values, beliefs, and preferences of the mediator, thereby undermining the 
legitimacy and weight of guidelines and standards external to the mediator.   
It seems to me that if mediation ethics were to be widely understood as 
encompassing the responsibilities of mediators to their profession and the pub-
lic as well as their duties to the parties and their personal integrity, mediators 
would have a sounder basis for making ethical decisions.  Moreover, philoso-
phers of morality have consistently argued that morality and ethics are non-
subjective in the sense that the norms of morality and ethics can be rationally 
and impartially justified.127  This is the dominant approach in professional eth-
ics thinking.  Michael Davis, for example, warned that “[i]ndividual-centered 
relativism . . . cuts off ethical discussion as soon as it begins,”128 and Michael 
Pritchard commented that “professional ethics is not an ethics for each individ-
ual professional simply to conjure up.”129   
The alternative to both party-centered mediation ethics and mediator-cen-
 
125. Id. (emphasis added).   
126. Id. at 326. 
127. See, e.g., BERNARD GERT, COMMON MORALITY 17 (2004) (“[G]iven agreement on the 
facts, a moral philosopher can show that a moral decision or judgment is mistaken if he can show that 
the moral decision or judgment is incompatible with the moral decisions or judgments that would be 
made by any impartial rational person.”); H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 20 (1963) 
(distinguishing “positive morality,” the “morality actually accepted and shared by a given social 
group,” from “critical morality,” the “general moral principles used in the criticism of actual social 
institutions including positive morality”). 
128. MICHAEL DAVIS, THINKING LIKE AN ENGINEER: STUDIES IN THE ETHICS OF A PROFESSION 
97 (1998). 
129. MICHAEL S. PRITCHARD, PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY 160 (2006). 
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tered mediation ethics is a critical account of mediation ethics that regards fair-
ness, justice, and unconscionability as normative concepts that can be rationally 
and impartially defined and distinguished from the subjective perceptions of 
them by the mediator.130  This alternative encourages the ethical mediator to 
look beyond the parties’ and his or her own personal views and beliefs, and to 
justify his or her decisions on the basis of external criteria.   
The previous discussion suggests that Menkel-Meadow was right in her re-
fusal to mediate Ahmed’s and Ziba’s case on their terms.  However, her deci-
sion would have carried more weight and been more helpful to other mediators 
had she grounded it in a general theory of ethics rather than in a personal sense 
of ethics.  I believe she would have been more likely to do so had the Model 
Standards stated the ethical obligations of mediators more clearly.  In my view, 
if mediators became more cognizant of the fact that their obligations lie with 
their profession and the public as well as with the parties, and if they were 
trained to assign weight to these obligations and accommodate them with their 
familiar loyalty to the parties, ethical decision making would become more 
structured, clear, and less personal.   
 
E. Too Limited Guidance on What to Do When Standards Conflict 
Standards may conflict.  One standard may conflict with another (for ex-
ample, Self-determination with Impartiality), or with an external standard (for 
example, Confidentiality with a court order for disclosure).  In such an event 
mediators have to weigh the conflicting norms, prioritize them, and choose the 
normative source to be followed.  
The guidance offered by the Model Standards on this process is quite lim-
ited.  In their Note on Construction, the Model Standards provide that “[t]hese 
Standards are to be read and construed in their entirety.  There is no priority 
significance attached to the sequence in which the Standards appear.”131  This 
point is made again in the Reporter’s Notes, which note that “[t]he interpretative 
principle that mandates that each Standard be read and interpreted in such a 
manner as to promote consistency with all other Standards is the presumed op-
erative principle guiding the drafting of the Model Standards . . . .”132   
The guidance of the Model Standards on events in which a standard con-
flicts with an external normative source is slightly more detailed.  They state 
 
130. See Shapira, Fairness, supra note 117, at 290–99; SHAPIRA, supra note 19, at ch. 11 § 11.3 
(discussing mediators’ duty of fairness). 
131. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Note on Construction. 
132. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 7. 
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that “a mediator should make every effort to comply with the spirit and intent 
of these Standards in resolving such conflicts,”133 and the Reporter’s Notes add 
that “a mediator ought to conduct oneself in a manner that retains and remains 
faithful to as much of the spirit and intent of the affected Standard, and all other 
Standards, as is possible.”134   
This general guidance is followed by more pointed guidance in the phrasing 
of some of the standards.  For example, the Standard of Self-determination pro-
vides that “a mediator may need to balance . . . party self-determination [for 
process design] with a mediator’s duty to conduct a quality process in accord-
ance with these Standards.”135  However, other standards, such as the Standard 
of Impartiality, do not refer to possible conflicts at all.   
It is submitted that the Model Standards must be carefully redrafted to bet-
ter respond to potential conflicts between standards.  For example, the Standard 
of Self-determination does not explain what balancing means, how the act of 
balancing is performed, and whether balancing applies to decisions other than 
process design.  The Reporter’s Notes on these points offer better, though in-
complete guidance, providing that 
while parties can exercise self-determination in the selection of 
their mediator, a mediator must consider Standard III: Con-
flicts of Interests and Standard IV: Competence when deciding 
whether to accept the invitation to serve.  Alternatively, the in-
terplay among Standards may result in a conflict; a mediator, 
for example, may feel pulled in conflicting directions when the 
mediator, duty-bound to support party self-determination 
(Standard I), recognizes that parties are trying to design a pro-
cess that is not mediation but want to call it mediation to gain 
confidentiality protections, thereby undermining the media-
tor’s obligation to sustain a quality process (Standard VI).  
Standard I(A)(1) and I(B) explicitly recognize this potential for 
conflict and indicates to the mediator that sustaining a quality 
process places limits on the extent to which party autonomy, 
external influences, and mediator self-interest should shape 
participant conduct.136   
The Reporter’s Notes, therefore, clearly see “balancing” as extending to 
mediation decisions other than process design, and this should be reflected in 
the language of the Standard of Self-determination.137   
 
133. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Note on Construction. 
134. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 8. 
135. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard I.A.1. 
136. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 9. 
137. See Omer Shapira, A Theory of Sharing Decision-Making in Mediation, 44 MCGEORGE L. 
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Moving beyond the particular case of the Standard of Self-determination, 
the Model Standards should state clearly at the outset that all the standards are 
relative, not absolute, and that no standard has a prima-facie priority over an-
other.138  There are probably no readymade answers to potential conflicts be-
tween standards but more helpful guidance could be provided.  It is submitted 
that a clearer direction could be incorporated into the Model Standards instruct-
ing mediators that in the event that their obligations seem to conflict, they must 
(a) search for an alternative course of action that is consistent with all of the 
standards; and (b) terminate or withdraw from the mediation when they cannot 
prevent the violation, minimizing as far as possible the harm resulting from it.   
For example, where the parties need legal information in order to make an 
informed decision (in accordance with the Standard of Self-determination), and 
the mediator may not provide that information him- or herself (because to do 
so would be a violation of the Standards of Impartiality or Quality of the Pro-
cess), the mediator should attempt to resolve this conflict of standards by look-
ing for an alternative course of action which is consistent with the Model Stand-
ards as a whole.  For example, he or she may suggest that the parties receive 
outside expert advice.  In many cases this direction will suffice.   
In other cases it might not.  For example, a mediator in a divorce case may 
learn from Party A that he or she is hiding assets from Party B, who is unaware 
of these assets.  The mediator cannot reveal that information to Party B, as it is 
protected by the Standard of Confidentiality, but equally cannot remain passive 
because (a) on these facts Party B cannot exercise self-determination (a viola-
tion of the Standard of Self-determination), and (b) it seems that the process is 
being abused by Party A (a violation of the Standard of Quality of the Process).  
If Party A insists on keeping the information to him- or herself it would seem 
that the way to reconcile the conflicting standards would be to bring the medi-
ation to an end while minimizing any possible violation of the standards, 
namely (in this case), without revealing the reason for the mediator’s decision 
to Party B.139   
 
REV. 923, 940–43 (2013). 
138. See id. at 936 (noting “the relativity of mediation values” and arguing that 
[n]o standard or rule has in-advance priority over all other standards or rules.  For 
example, it cannot be maintained that party self-determination is more important 
than mediator impartiality, or that mediator impartiality is more important than 
confidentiality and so forth.  The weight of each norm must be ascertained in 
context, and no norm always trumps the others.). 
139. This scenario is discussed in Advisory Opinion of the North Carolina Dispute Resolution 
Commission Opinion 10–16 (2010), http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/DRC/Documents/
10-16r_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/54UY-SEB8]. 
SHAPIRA-22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/16  2:20 PM 
2016] MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS 107 
F. The Missing Standards: Deconstructing the Standard of Quality of the 
Process into Standards of Diligence, Honesty, Respect, Professional 
Integrity, and Fairness   
The Model Standards have a nine-standard architecture, which was kept 
during their revision in 2005.140  While each standard focuses on a particular 
ethical concern—for example, party self-determination, mediator impartiality, 
conflicts of interest, and so on—one standard stands out as an exception.  The 
Standard of Quality of the Process is aimed at advancing a quality process.141  
It is the most detailed of the Model Standards, purporting to deal with a variety 
of issues, including “diligence, timeliness, safety, presence of the appropriate 
participants, party participation, procedural fairness, party competency and mu-
tual respect among all participants.”142  The following discussion raises serious 
concerns about the scope, content, integrity, and goals of the Standard of Qual-
ity of the Process, and calls for a comprehensive revision of it that will funda-
mentally change the current structure of the Model Standards.   
1. The Imprecise Scope of the Standard of Quality of the Process  
The Quality of the Process Standard has been described by the Reporter’s 
Notes as “a series of distinct, concrete ways in which a mediator could act to 
advance a quality process.”143  One problem with this statement is that a quality 
process may be advanced in many ways already covered by the other standards, 
for example by impartial practice, mediator competence, informed party deci-
sion-making, and preservation of confidentiality.  The standard is therefore too 
narrow in this respect and reads as an arbitrary and partial list of possible ways 
that can contribute to good practice.   
 
2. Misplaced Elements that Belong to Other Existing Standards 
Having noted the vague scope of the term “quality process,” which can 
equally apply to other standards as well, a closer look at the Quality of the Pro-
cess Standard indeed reveals that it covers issues belonging to other existing 
standards.  The most notable example is “party competency,” which is referred 
to both in the statement in section VI.A and in subsection VI.A.10, the latter 
providing that “[i]f a party appears to have difficulty comprehending the pro-
cess, issues, or settlement options, or difficulty participating in a mediation, the 
 
140. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1.  
141. Id. at Standard VI. 
142. Id. at Standard VI.A. 
143. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 17.  
SHAPIRA-22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/16  2:20 PM 
108 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:81 
mediator should explore the circumstances and potential accommodations, 
modifications or adjustments that would make possible the party’s capacity to 
comprehend, participate and exercise self-determination.”144  The Reporter’s 
Notes comment on this provision reveals that it was designed to benefit “per-
sons with recognized disabilities,”145 assuming, so it seems, that “ordinary” me-
diation parties always comprehend the process, issues, and options, and have 
no difficulty participating in the mediation.  It is argued that in effect subsection 
VI.A.10 addresses a general obligation of mediators, which is part of their duty 
to “conduct a mediation based on the principle of party self-determination,”146 
and to be mindful of any “party’s capacity to comprehend, participate and ex-
ercise self-determination.”147  This provision therefore addresses a component 
of party self-determination and belongs to the Standard of Self-determination.   
3. A Mismatch between the Standard’s Statement and the Provisions 
that Follow 
One might presume that provisions VI.A.1–9 follow from and elaborate on 
the standard’s statement in section VI.A.  However, this is hardly the case.  As 
noted above, section VI.A provides that “[a] mediator shall conduct a mediation 
in accordance with these Standards and in a manner that promotes diligence, 
timeliness, safety, presence of the appropriate participants, party participation, 
procedural fairness, party competency and mutual respect among all partici-
pants.”148  Diligence is referred to in provision VI.A.1, and timeliness in provi-
sion VI.A.2.  Safety is not mentioned in any of section VI.A’s provisions, but 
is referred to in section VI.B.  The presence of appropriate participants is ad-
dressed in provision VI.A.3.  Party participation is discussed in provision 
VI.A.10.  Procedural fairness is not mentioned explicitly as a term or concept 
in any of the provisions, and as it is left undefined by the Model Standards, one 
can only wonder whether it is or is not reflected in the content of some of them.  
Party competency is referred to in provision VI.A.10, while mutual respect 
among all participants is not mentioned in any of the provisions.   
The reader is therefore left to wonder: the elements of a quality process that 
make up the statement in section VI.A do not correspond with the subsequent 
provisions, neither in the order in which these elements are set nor in the con-
tent of the provisions, which seem to cover some of the elements but ignore 
others.  Likewise, uncertainty surrounds provisions VI.A.4–9 which are not ex-
 
144. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.10. 
145. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 19. 
146. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard I.A. 
147. Id. at Standard VI.A.10.  
148. Id. at Standard VI.A. 
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plicitly referred to in the statement of section VI.A.  What is the guiding prin-
ciple behind them?  Are they, for lack of other candidates in section VI.A, il-
lustrations of procedural fairness?  Clearly, if section VI.A is to stay it must be 
redrafted to enable readers to easily identify the components of a quality pro-
cess and the corresponding provisions that define and explain these compo-
nents.   
    
4. The Missing Standards Hiding in the Standard of Quality of the 
Process  
A close examination of the Standard of Quality of the Process reveals that 
in effect it is comprised of five separate standards: diligence, honesty, respect, 
party self-determination, and professional integrity. While self-determination 
is a standard in its own right (Standard I), the other four are not recognized by 
the Model Standards as independent standards.  It is submitted that each of 
these standards deserves its own independent status.  Since I cannot offer a full 
account of these standards here,149 the following discussion merely aims to flesh 
out the various rationales that are served by the Standard of Quality of the Pro-
cess, and point to the way it can be reorganized and reconstructed within a new 
set of standards.  Doing so, it is further argued, will enhance the clarity of the 
Model Standards’ ethical guidance to mediators and other mediation partici-
pants.   
   
a. Diligence 
Mediators,150 like lawyers,151 judges,152 and other professionals must act 
 
149. See SHAPIRA, supra note 19, at ch. 4, 8, & 9 (discussing the meaning of these standards). 
150. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA RULES, supra note 95, at R. 3.857(a); CODE OF ETHICS FOR 
MEDIATORS Standard 3(c) (amended 2013) (ALA. CTR. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1995), http://ala-
bamaadr.org/web/roster-documents/documents/med_Mediator_Code_of_Ethics_150501_updated.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JL8E-YW56] [hereinafter ALABAMA CODE]; STANDARDS OF ETHICS AND PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTIFIED MEDIATORS § K.1, at 7 (JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF VA. 2011), http://
www.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin/aoc/djs/programs/drs/mediation/soe.pdf [https://perma.cc/F23R-
Z8DK] [hereinafter VIRGINIA STANDARDS]; FLORIDA RULES, supra note 91, R. 10.430, at 113; 
ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR MEDIATORS Standard V, at 32–33 (GA. COMM’N ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
1994) http://godr.org/sites/default/files/Godr/su-
preme_court_adr_rules/APPENDIX%20C,%20CHAP%201,%206-18-2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6NXD-3LD8] [hereinafter GEORGIA STANDARDS]. 
151. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3, at 17 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016), avail-
able at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/
model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html [https://perma.cc/W23K-3EG6]. 
152. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 3 (JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
SHAPIRA-22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/16  2:20 PM 
110 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:81 
with diligence.  Without attempting to draft a comprehensive Standard of Dili-
gence at the moment, it seems that the distinction that the Model Standards 
suggest between “diligence” and “timeliness” is unnecessary, because an obli-
gation of diligence encompasses both the requirement to be “prepared to com-
mit the attention essential to an effective mediation” (VI.A.1, emphasis added), 
and to be able to “satisfy the reasonable expectation of the parties concerning 
the timing of a mediation” (VI.A.2, emphasis added).  The diligence rule that 
applies to lawyers, for example, refers to commitment and dedication to the 
interests of the client, controlled workload, and avoidance of procrastination.153   
One aspect of diligence, therefore, is the provision of services on time, with-
out delay, and in the context of a mediation a delay should be judged not only 
by reference to external criteria such as a hearing date at court, but by reference 
to the parties’ preferences regarding timing as well.  If the parties indicate that 
they expect the mediator to be available to them in the next month, and he or 
she is unable to meet that reasonable expectation concerning the timing of the 
mediation, taking the case and failing to meet that expectation would be in 
breach of the mediator’s duty of diligence, because the mediation will not be 
held within the timeframe legitimately expected by the parties.  It is suggested, 
therefore, that what the Model Standards term “diligence” and “timeliness” 
should be brought together under an independent Standard of Diligence, which 
includes the intention and ability to both commit the attention necessary for an 
effective mediation, and respond to their needs and expectations regarding tim-
ing without undue delay.   
b. Honesty 
Although section VI.A does not refer to a mediator obligation concerning 
honesty as an element of a quality process, provision VI.A.4 does, providing 
that “[a] mediator should promote honesty and candor between and among all 
participants, and a mediator shall not knowingly misrepresent any material fact 
or circumstance in the course of a mediation.”154  Again, I do not wish to elab-
orate on the meaning of mediator honesty at the moment.  Instead I would like 
to point out that honesty is an important feature of professional conduct155  and 
 
U.S. 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-states-judges 
[https://perma.cc/662Y-2K6X]. 
153. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 151, R. 1.3 cmt., at 17. 
154. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.4.  
155. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. BAYLES, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 79–80 (Kenneth King & Donna 
Oberholtzer eds., 1981). 
SHAPIRA-22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/16  2:20 PM 
2016] MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS 111 
should be recognized as such by the Model Standards within a separate Stand-
ard of Honesty.156   
Furthermore, we should recognize that mediator honesty is not only a mat-
ter of process quality, but a legitimate expectation of parties of a trustworthy 
professional as well.  Professor Arthur A. Chaykin, for example, correctly ob-
served that “[mediation] parties rely on the mediator to be truthful and hon-
est.”157  A dishonest mediator not only undermines the quality of the mediation, 
but also betrays the parties’ trust that he or she be truthful and avoid lying and 
deception.  Thus, the obligation of honesty should not be relegated to a subsec-
tion of a Standard of Quality of the Process.  Rather, it ought to be upgraded 
into a separate Standard of Honesty standing in its own right, comprised of, 
inter alia, a duty of mediators to conduct mediations with honesty and encour-
age honesty between participants.   
 
c. Respect   
Respect is mentioned as a component of a quality process in the statement 
in section VI.A, which provides that “[a] mediator shall conduct a mediation 
. . . in a manner that promotes . . . mutual respect among all participants.”158  
This element is not referred to again in any subsequent provision of the Model 
Standards.  The reader might speculate that provision VI.A.4, which instructs 
the mediator to promote “honesty and candor” between participants, is aimed 
at promoting respect among participants, but are “respect” and “honesty and 
candor” the same?  And if they are, should it not be made explicitly clear?   
In my view, respect and honesty are different aspects of ethical behavior.  
Respect is a norm which focuses on the preservation of the dignity of partici-
pants, instructing the mediator to avoid the use of abusive, discriminatory, and 
humiliating language, and calling on mediators to encourage the participants to 
act accordingly.159  Like honesty, respect reflects a legitimate expectation of 
mediators to be worthy of the parties’ trust. 160  Respect is not only a way to 
advance a quality process, but a fundamental duty of the mediator in conducting 
 
156. See, e.g., Kovach, supra note 13, at 136–37. 
157. See Arthur A. Chaykin, Mediator Liability: A New Role for Fiduciary Duties?, 53 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 731, 744 (1984). 
158. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A. 
159. See, e.g., Luban’s treatment of the concept of dignity in DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND 
HUMAN DIGNITY 70–71, 88 (2007). 
160. See, e.g., BAYLES, supra note 155. 
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a mediation.161  The Model Standards, therefore, were correct to include a ref-
erence to respect in the statement in section VI.A but should have elaborated 
on its meaning, assigned it more weight, and constructed it as an independent 
Standard of Respect comprised of, inter alia, a duty of mediators to conduct 
mediations with respect, and a duty to promote mutual respect among partici-
pants.  I cannot offer a detailed account of such a standard here, but I believe 
that there is a sound basis for the development and adoption of a Standard of 
Respect within a new construction of Model Standards.162   
d. Party Self-determination 
The statement in section VI.A refers to two components of quality process 
which are further discussed in provision VI.A.10: the promotion of party com-
petency and party participation.163  These components actually belong with the 
Standard of Self-determination, which is an independent standard (Standard I).  
Self-determination, which is recognized by the Model Standards as “a funda-
mental principle of mediation practice,”164 is defined by them as “the act of 
coming to a voluntary, uncoerced decision in which each party makes free and 
informed choices as to process and outcome.”165  Self-determination can only 
take place where the parties have the capacity or competency to make decisions, 
and therefore the element of party capacity or competency should be part of the 
Standard of Self-determination.   
With respect to party participation, the way it appears in provision VI.A.10 
ties it with the Standard of Self-determination as well: it refers to “difficulty 
participating in a mediation” and to steps the mediator should take to “make 
possible the party’s capacity to comprehend, participate and exercise self-de-
termination.”166  If the drafters of the Model Standards wanted mediators to 
encourage party participation as a general value of mediation,167 that is, in any 
mediation irrespective of difficulties hampering participation or disabilities, 
this is not made clear.168  Moreover, we should recognize that party participa-
tion in the process is in itself an issue subject to party choice.  In other words, 
a mediator should encourage parties to participate in order to give them more 
 
161. Id.  
162. For such an account, see SHAPIRA, supra note 19, at ch. 9 § 9.2.  
163. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A. 
164. Id. at Standard I.A.1. 
165. Id. at Standard I.A. 
166. Id. at Standard VI.A.10. 
167. See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected 
Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001). 
168. On the contrary, the REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 19, refers to provision VI.A.10 
as addressing the situation of mediation with persons with recognized disabilities. 
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opportunity to exercise self-determination with regard to the content and design 
of the process, but it is up to the parties to decide on the extent of their partici-
pation in the process.   
e. Professional Integrity 
Provisions VI.A.3, VI.A.5–9, and sections VI.B and VI.C cover a wide 
range of issues under the general heading of “quality process,” including the 
presence or absence of persons at a mediation,169 provision of information by 
the mediator,170 inadequate labeling of a process as mediation, recommendation 
of other dispute resolution processes,171 undertaking of additional dispute reso-
lution roles in the same matter,172 use of mediation to further criminal con-
duct,173 domestic abuse or violence among the parties,174 and conduct that jeop-
ardizes conducting the mediation consistent with the standards.175  What is the 
connection between these issues, besides their association with “quality”?  Do 
they have common themes?  Can they be reorganized in a more meaningful 
way?   
I want to suggest that all these instances manifest an underlying obligation 
of mediators that exceeds their duties to the parties.  They illustrate mediators’ 
commitment to interests other than the parties’; a commitment to the interests 
of the profession of mediation and the public to protect the process of media-
tion, that is, a responsibility of mediators to preserve the institution of mediation 
and public trust in it.   
I will call this underlying responsibility a duty of integrity.  Some codes of 
conduct for mediators refer to this duty explicitly.  The Georgia Ethical Stand-
ards for Mediators, for example, provide that “[a] mediator is the guardian of 
the integrity of the mediation process,”176 and the California Dispute Resolution 
Council (CDRC) Standards of Practice for California Mediators state that 
“[e]very mediator bears the responsibility of conducting mediations in a manner 
that . . . promotes trust in the integrity . . . of mediators.”177  None of the codes, 
however, defines integrity.  
 
169. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.3. 
170. Id. at Standard VI.A.5. 
171. Id. at Standard VI.A.6, VI.A.7. 
172. Id. at Standard VI.A.8. 
173. Id. at Standard VI.A.9. 
174. Id. at Standard VI.B. 
175. Id. at Standard VI.C. 
176. GEORGIA STANDARDS, supra note 150, Standard IV.B, at 31. 
177. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR CALIFORNIA MEDIATORS pmbl. (CAL. DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION COUNCIL), http://www.cdrc.net/mediator-standards [https://perma.cc/FX9D-PMKX]. 
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Integrity, it is suggested, is the quality of being complete or whole,178 and I 
would argue that a mediator exhibits professional integrity when in doing his 
or her job he or she is truly committed to the definition of his or her role and to 
the values and principles associated with that role.179  Thus, a mediator who is 
truly committed to his or her role must conduct a “whole” or “complete” pro-
cess.  Provisions VI.A.3, VI.A.5–9, VI.B and VI.C are in fact illustrations of 
four distinct aspects of professional integrity, which are briefly discussed next.   
i. An Exercise of Professional Discretion 
A process of mediation will not be “complete” or “whole” where persons 
whose presence is important for the mediation to be effective are absent.180  As 
a matter of integrity, mediators are expected to exercise professional discretion, 
raise this issue with the parties, and make them aware of it.181  This, it is sub-
mitted, is the true rationale of provision VI.A.3, which is an illustration of the 
duty to exercise professional discretion, providing that “[t]he presence or ab-
sence of persons at a mediation depends on the agreement of the parties and the 
mediator.  The parties and mediator may agree that others may be excluded 
from particular sessions or from all sessions.”182   
The reader of this provision should already know, by reason of the Standard 
of Self-determination and its application to decisions on process-design, that 
parties ought to be involved in the decision on the presence or absence of per-
sons at the mediation.183  What justifies the inclusion of this provision in the 
Model Standards is the new element which is introduced by provision VI.A.3, 
namely that the mediator should be a party to the decision, a requirement which 
stems from the mediator’s duty to conduct a whole or complete process.  What 
is missing from the current provision, therefore, is a reference to the responsi-
bility of the mediator for bringing up the issue of the presence or absence of 
persons in a mediation in the first place, when, in his or her professional judg-
ment, it has a bearing on the effectiveness of the mediation.   
ii. Separation of Professional Roles and Services  
Provision VI.A.5 illustrates another aspect of process integrity rather than 
 
178. See, e.g., PRITCHARD, supra note 129, at 67. 
179. On the meaning of professional integrity, see DAMIAN COX ET AL., INTEGRITY AND THE 
FRAGILE SELF 103 (2003). 
180. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.3. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at Standard I.A.  
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a component of quality: the separation of professional roles and services.184  It 
provides that “[t]he role of a mediator differs substantially from other profes-
sional roles.  Mixing the role of a mediator and the role of another profession is 
problematic and thus, a mediator should distinguish between the roles.”185  This 
is not a matter of quality but one of integrity: mediation is not arbitration, coun-
seling, or neutral evaluation, and the provision of services other than mediation 
by mediators in processes presented as mediation undermines both the integrity 
of the particular mediations and that of the institution of mediation.   
Provision VI.A.8 complements provision VI.A.5. It envisions situations in 
which mediators switch roles to another dispute resolution role and conditions 
it upon the parties’ informed consent: “A mediator shall not undertake an addi-
tional dispute resolution role in the same matter without the consent of the par-
ties.  Before providing such service, a mediator shall inform the parties of the 
implications of the change in process and obtain their consent to the change.”186  
This requirement is in line with the Standard of Self-determination, which ties 
party self-determination with informed choices.187  Like provision VI.A.5, this 
provision is about integrity, not quality, warning mediators of the dangers of 
mixing professional roles.  The provision lacks a reminder that mediators may 
only do so if they can proceed with the new role without violating mediation 
standards such as confidentiality and conflicts of interest, which have a contin-
uing application subsequent to the mediation.  For example, the Standard of 
Conflicts of Interest provides in this context that “[s]ubsequent to a mediation, 
a mediator shall not establish another relationship with any of the participants 
in any matter that would raise questions about the integrity of the mediation.”188   
iii. The Appropriateness of a Case to Mediation 
Provision VI.A.7 provides that “[a] mediator may recommend, when ap-
propriate, that parties consider resolving their dispute through arbitration, coun-
seling, neutral evaluation or other processes.”189  What is the purpose of re-
minding mediators to do so?  The Reporter’s Notes on this point seems almost 
apologetic: “it certainly is plausible for a mediator to recommend, when appro-
priate, that the parties consider resolving their dispute through some other third-
party process.”190   
 
184. Id. at Standard VI.A.5. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at Standard VI.A.8. 
187. Id. at Standard I.A.  
188. Id. at Standard III.F. 
189. Id. at Standard VI.A.7. 
190. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 18. 
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It is argued that the wording of this provision misses an important point 
which becomes apparent once one reads it with the rationale of protecting the 
integrity of the mediation and the mediator in mind: a mediator must consider 
whether mediation is appropriate for the dispute and must recommend that the 
parties consider other processes if he or she considers mediation to be an inap-
propriate process for the dispute or if he or she considers other procedures to 
be more appropriate than mediation.191   
Compare, for example, the Model Standards’ provision to the Florida 
Rules, which provide that “[a] mediator is responsible for confirming that me-
diation is an appropriate dispute resolution process under the circumstances of 
each case,”192 and to the Texas Ethical Guidelines for Mediators, which note 
that “[a] mediator should postpone, recess, or terminate the mediation process 
if it is apparent to the mediator that the case is inappropriate for mediation.”193  
Again, behind all these provisions lies the concern for the integrity of media-
tion: conducting mediation when doing so is inappropriate or less appropriate 
than other dispute resolution procedures could jeopardize its integrity.  This 
aspect of integrity should be in mind when section VI.B is read: “If a mediator 
is made aware of domestic abuse or violence among the parties, the mediator 
shall take appropriate steps including, if necessary, postponing, withdrawing 
from or terminating the mediation.”194   
iv. The Prevention of Process Abuse or Substantial Defects in the 
Process 
Provisions VI.A.6 and VI.A.9 and subsection VI.C together make an im-
portant statement that the Model Standards hesitate to present straightfor-
wardly: that mediators have a responsibility to conduct mediation in a manner 
that does not allow for process abuse or substantive defects in the process.195  
This is another aspect of process integrity, that is the conduct of a “whole” pro-
cess in accordance with its values and principles, a process which neither is 
abused (used for purposes for which it has not been designed) nor suffers from 
serious defects (key elements of the process are missing).   
Provision VI.A.6, for example, provides that “[a] mediator shall not con-
duct a dispute resolution procedure other than mediation but label it mediation 
 
191. Id. 
192. FLORIDA RULES, supra note 91, R. 10.400, at 111. 
193. TEXAS GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at § 13. 
194. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.B. 
195. Id. at Standards VI.A.6, VI.A.9, VI.C. 
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in an effort to gain the protection of rules, statutes, or other governing authori-
ties pertaining to mediation.”196  This provision is not about the “quality” of the 
process, but rather on the inconsistency between a “true” process of mediation 
with integrity and a process which is (to use the Reporter’s Notes words) the 
product of “a ruse of labeling a dispute resolution process as ‘mediation’ in 
order to get its benefits.”197  This is a clear example of the duty of mediators to 
safeguard the integrity of mediation.   
Provision VI.A.9 makes a similar point, providing that “[i]f a mediation is 
being used to further criminal conduct, a mediator should take appropriate steps 
including, if necessary, postponing, withdrawing from or terminating the me-
diation.”198  It is quite clear that mediation, like any legitimate dispute resolu-
tion process, must be carried out in line with the rule of law, and any use of 
mediation to further illegal purposes would be an abuse of process and result in 
a defective mediation.  Moreover, as commentators such as Robert A. Baruch 
Bush,199 John W. Cooley,200 and myself201 have observed, allowing mediation 
to be used for illegal purposes or to produce illegal outcomes is likely to bring 
mediation into disrepute, harming the standing of mediation and undermining 
public trust in the profession and process of mediation.  With this rationale in 
mind, provision VI.A.9 seems wanting in at least two respects: first, its unjus-
tified focus on criminal rather than illegal conduct—the product of the revision 
of the 1994 version of the Model Standards which did refer to illegal con-
duct202—because using mediation to further illegal conduct is also an unwar-
ranted abuse of the process that undermines its integrity; and second, its omis-
sion to expressly address the responsibility of mediators with regard to illegal 
mediated agreements.203   
Subsection VI.C is a sort of default clause, triggering, without using these 
precise words, a mediators’ duty to intervene in incidents of process abuse, 
providing that “[i]f a mediator believes that participant conduct, including that 
of the mediator, jeopardizes conducting a mediation consistent with these 
 
196. Id. at Standard VI.A.6. 
197. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 18. 
198. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.9. 
199. Robert A. Baruch Bush, A Study of Ethical Dilemmas and Policy Implications, 1994 J. OF 
DISP. RESOL. 1, 24 (1994). 
200. John W. Cooley, A Classical Approach to Mediation—Part I: Classical Rhetoric and the 
Art of Persuasion in Mediation, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 83, 130 (1993). 
201. Shapira, Decision-Making in Mediation, supra note 137, at 956. 
202.  Compare MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.9., with MODEL STANDARDS 
OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard VI (1994); Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Model Standards of Con-
duct for Mediators, 17 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 323, 328–29 (1997). 
203. See infra Section II.G.2. 
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Standards, a mediator shall take appropriate steps including, if necessary, post-
poning, withdrawing from or terminating the mediation.”204  If, for example, a 
mediator has reason to believe that one party is concealing vital information 
from the other party, or hidden assets that are relevant to the dispute, the medi-
ator will have a duty to take some action to prevent the process from being 
abused.  Subsection VI.B may also illustrate such an event, where the mediator 
suspects that the voluntariness of the process and the self-determination of one 
of the parties are threatened by domestic abuse or violence among the parties.   
v. A Summary of the Argument on Professional Integrity 
It is submitted, therefore, that provisions VI.A.3 and VI.A.5–9 and subsec-
tions VI.B and VI.C of the Standard of Quality of the Process should be re-
grouped and reorganized under a Standard of Professional Integrity.  The new 
standard will guide mediators on their responsibility to protect the integrity of 
the process, identifying four aspects of professional integrity: Exercise of Pro-
fessional Discretion, Separation of Professional Roles and Services, The Ap-
propriateness of a Case to Mediation, and The Prevention of Process Abuse or 
Substantial Defects in the Process.  
 
5. Moving from Procedural Fairness (as a Component of a Quality 
Process) to a Standard of Fairness 
The last conceptual issue I would like to draw attention to with respect to 
the Standard of Quality of the Process is its wanting treatment of fairness.  The 
Model Standards use the term “procedural fairness” to indicate one way of pro-
moting a quality process.205  Fairness, however, is defined by neither the Model 
Standards nor the Reporter’s Notes.  As observed above, it is difficult to ascer-
tain which of the provisions of subsection VI.A is an expression of fairness.   
Elsewhere I have offered a detailed account of the meaning of fairness in 
the context of mediation.206  One meaning of fairness that I identified was fair-
ness as “playing by the rules,” which means, in the context of mediation, fol-
lowing the rules that apply to mediation.  On the basis of that account of fair-
ness, it seems to me that by holding mediators to a norm of procedural fairness 
without saying more, the Model Standards merely instruct mediators to follow 
the standards that already apply to them in the conduct of mediation, namely 
 
204. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.C.  
205. Id. at Standard VI.A.  
206. Shapira, Fairness, supra note 117. 
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respect party self-determination, be competent, act impartially, disclose con-
flicts of interest, preserve confidentiality, and so on.207  In other words, the ref-
erence in the Model Standards to “procedural fairness” as a normative concept 
does not promote the “quality” of mediation beyond the threshold that the 
standards already delineate in the language of their provisions.  Any additional 
promise of “quality” will require the Model Standards to adopt a notion of fair-
ness which I referred to as a substantive conception of fairness.208   
A substantive conception of fairness is an attitude toward rules that prefers 
substance over form; understands, construes, applies, and enforces rules flexi-
bly; and accommodates circumstances, context, and reality in accordance with 
the purpose and spirit of the rules.209  For example, an insistence on informed 
consent as an ingredient of party self-determination (while treating formal con-
sent as illusionary self-determination) is to insist on “quality” consent con-
sistent with a conception of substantive fairness.210  To take another example, 
to insist on mediator impartiality (or neutrality) while ignoring power imbal-
ances between parties is to award priority to form over substance, that is, to 
prefer in effect the stronger party over the weaker and sacrifice the “quality” or 
substantive fairness of the process.211  This approach to the interpretation and 
application of the standards applies to all of them and should, it is argued, be 
grounded in a separate Standard of Fairness in the Model Standards.   
G. Ignoring the Accountability of Mediators to Outcomes 
The Model Standards regard mediation outcomes as falling within the ju-
risdiction of the parties, providing in the Standard of Self-determination that 
outcomes are subject to party self-determination and therefore should be pro-
duced by the parties.212  They do not explicitly refer to a responsibility of me-
diators for the content of mediation outcomes.  Moreover, nowhere do they re-
fer to any criteria that mediated outcomes should meet.   
The general impression the reader gets, therefore, is that whatever the par-
ties decide should suffice.  Harold Abramson, for example, observed in the 
course of analyzing the ethical dilemma scenario discussed earlier, that the 
 
207. Id. at 290–94 (discussing formal fairness). 
208. Id. at 295–99. 
209. Id.  
210. See, e.g., id. at 298–99; see also REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 16 (The meaning 
the Reporter’s Notes to the Model Standards assign to the word “consent” in the Standard of Confi-
dentiality, while discussing different approaches of mediators to matters disclosed by mediation parties 
in a caucus: “Whichever practice is adopted by a mediator, Standard V (B) affirms that it is a mediator’s 
duty to insure that party consent to the approach is known, meaningful and timely.”) (emphasis added).  
211. See, e.g., Shapira, Fairness, supra note 117, at 304–10.  
212. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard I.A.   
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Model Standards “require mediators to focus on process fairness and assume 
that when process fairness is ensured, substantive fairness will follow”;213 they 
“steer clear of discussions of fairness, equity, and substantive justice,”214 and 
“do not hold mediators accountable for the substantive fairness of the mediation 
agreements they help to orchestrate.”215   
I think that if this is indeed the Model Standards’ approach to outcome ac-
countability then it is wrong.216  I believe, however, that the Model Standards’ 
guidance on the process of mediation provides two hints regarding the criteria 
for mediated outcomes, which could be interpreted as an implied and partial 
(although far from satisfying) recognition of mediator accountability for out-
comes.  These instances are discussed next under two headings: uninformed 
outcomes and illegal outcomes.   
1. Uninformed Outcomes 
The Standard of Self-determination places mediators under a duty to con-
duct the mediation on the basis of party self-determination,217 which is defined, 
inter alia, as the act of making “informed choices as to . . . outcome.”218  Logi-
cally, this should lead to finding here a responsibility of the mediator for the 
outcome of mediation, because if a mediated outcome is not the product of an 
informed decision, and the mediator is aware of that, then arguably the mediator 
has not complied with his or her duty to conduct a mediation based on party 
self-determination.   
However, the Model Standards shy away from this conclusion and prefer 
to dilute it by providing that “[a] mediator cannot personally ensure that each 
party has made free and informed choices to reach particular decisions, but, 
where appropriate, a mediator should make the parties aware of the importance 
of consulting other professionals to help them make informed choices.”219  The 
Reporter’s Notes explain this choice with the “significant controversy about 
whether and how a mediator might insure that a party’s decisions are suitably 
informed.”220   
 
213. MEDIATION ETHICS, supra note 7, at 329. 
214. Id. 
215. Id.  See also id. at 115 (Waldman noting that “the Standards are silent on the matter of 
substantive fairness”). 
216. See Shapira, Fairness, supra note 117, at 334–39 (arguing for mediators’ accountability for 
outcomes).  
217. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard I.A (“A mediator shall conduct a mediation 
based on the principle of party self-determination.”). 
218. Id. (emphasis added). 
219. Id. at Standard I.A.2. 
220. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 10. 
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In my view this is not a convincing argument.  Many standards for media-
tors are saddled with controversies and difficult to apply.  Following the Re-
porter’s Notes’ line of thinking could result, for example, in mediators being 
held unaccountable for conducting mediation with partiality (what does impar-
tiality really mean?), for ignoring a conflict of interest (what counts as a conflict 
of interest?), or for giving professional advice (did the mediator advise the par-
ties, evaluate their case, or merely provide them with information?).  Evading 
the difficulty, as the Model Standards do, is surely not the right approach.   
Elsewhere I have suggested a different approach, arguing that “[f]ollowing 
logically from the duty to conduct mediations on the basis of party self-deter-
mination is a duty to prevent an outcome that a party agrees to without exercis-
ing self-determination—a decision that is involuntary, coerced, uninformed, or 
made in a state of incapacity.”221  This approach is echoed in a number of codes 
of conduct for mediators.  The Mediation Council of Illinois (MCI) Profes-
sional Standards of Practice for Mediators (hereinafter: Illinois Standards), for 
example, provide that the mediator has a duty to ensure that clients make in-
formed decisions;222 the Florida Committee Notes to the Florida Rules note that 
“[a] mediator must not . . . knowingly allow a participant to make a decision 
based on misrepresented facts or circumstances”;223 the Alabama Code of Eth-
ics for Mediators provides that “[a] mediator shall assist the parties in reaching 
an informed . . . agreement”;224 and the Oregon Mediation Association Core 
Standards of Mediation Practice provide that “[m]ediators should suspend, end, 
or withdraw from the mediation if they believe a participant is unable to give 
Informed Consent.”225   
While I agree with the Model Standards that a mediator cannot ensure that 
parties make decisions that are based on complete information, I believe it is 
essential to clarify that mediators must take steps, consistent with the Standards, 
so that party decision-making is based on the information relevant to the deci-
sion-making.226  I find some support for this view in the Model Standards them-
selves, in subsection VI.A.10 of the Standard of Quality of the Process.  Sub-
section VI.A.10, which, as I have argued earlier, should be treated as part of the 
Standard of Self-determination, provides that “[i]f a party appears to have dif-
 
221. Shapira, Fairness, supra note 117, at 336 (emphasis added). 
222. ILLINOIS STANDARDS, supra note 70, at § VI. 
223. FLORIDA RULES, supra note 91, Committee Notes to R. 10.310, at 106. 
224. ALABAMA CODE, supra note 150, at Standard 4(a). 
225. CORE STANDARDS OF MEDIATION PRACTICE Standard II cmt. 5 (OR. MEDIATION ASS’N 
2005), http://www.omediate.org/pg61.cfm [https://perma.cc/6LV5-VP6Q]. 
226. See SHAPIRA, supra note 19, at ch. 4 § 4.5.3.2.  
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ficulty comprehending the . . . settlement options . . . the mediator should ex-
plore the circumstances and potential accommodations, modifications or ad-
justments that would make possible the party’s capacity to comprehend, partic-
ipate and exercise self-determination.”227  In my view, this language should be 
interpreted as an indirect and partial recognition of mediator responsibility for 
informed mediated outcomes, and should be read as a sign to mediators to take 
account of outcomes.   
Certainly, the Model Standards do not go far enough on this issue, and 
should be amended so as to include clearer guidance on mediators’ responsibil-
ities regarding uninformed outcomes.  Failure to recognize such responsibility 
would be wrong for two reasons: first, mediation parties rely on their mediators 
to support them in the process of mediation and provide them with a minimal 
safety-net that will protect them from harm which the mediator is aware of or 
reasonably expected to be aware of;228  and second, because such accountability 
is necessary in order to preserve public trust in mediators and the institution of 
mediation.229   
2. Illegal Outcomes 
Another hint as to some form of acknowledgment of mediator outcome ac-
countability by the Model Standards can be found in subsection VI.A.9 of the 
Standard of Quality of the Process, which instructs mediators to take appropri-
ate steps when “a mediation is being used to further criminal conduct.”230  This 
language, so it seems, could cover under certain circumstances a mediated 
agreement to act in violation of the law.  Again, this limited reference to poten-
tial mediator intervention due to the content of the mediation or its outcome is 
inadequate and needs to be addressed.   
The Model Standards should be much clearer on the expectations of medi-
ators when the mediated outcome is illegal. The Georgia Standards, for exam-
ple, clearly state in a Standard of Fairness that “[t]he mediator . . . must protect 
the integrity of the process. . . .  A mediator should not be a party to an agree-
ment which is illegal . . . ;”231 and the Guide for Federal Employee Mediators 
instructs mediators to withdraw from the mediation if the parties insist on an 
 
227. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.10 (emphasis added). 
228. See Judith L. Maute, Mediator Accountability: Responding to Fairness Concerns, 1990 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 347, 351 (1990). 
229. Id. at 349. 
230. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.9.  
231. GEORGIA STANDARDS, supra note 150, Standard IV, at 30. 
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illegal agreement.232  Mediation commentators have also suggested that an ille-
gal mediation outcome should prompt mediators into action.  Bush, for exam-
ple, argued that “if [the mediator] does nothing, he may bring mediation into 
disrepute if the illegal agreements are later discovered”;233 Cooley noted that 
“where the mediator or nonparties perceive, or could perceive, the resulting 
agreement to be illegal . . . the mediator must apprise the parties of the problem, 
redirect their efforts toward generating new, acceptable options, and, as a last 
resort, withdraw as mediator and terminate the mediation;”234 and in an article 
that explored the limitations on party self-determination in mediation, including 
the parties’ right to make decisions on outcome, I argued that  
a mediation that produces an illegal agreement jeopardizes me-
diation integrity because it might be perceived as an abuse of 
process for unworthy goals, undermining important social in-
terests such as preservation of the rule of law and encourage-
ment of public use of mediation.  An illegal mediated agree-
ment ignores the rule of law and a process associated with such 
an outcome might deter ordinary, law-abiding people from us-
ing it.235   
Illegal outcomes, as well as uninformed outcomes, are merely examples of 
possible mediated outcomes that mediators must not ignore, a category that may 
also include unconscionable, grossly unfair, and immoral agreements.236  These 
incidents all raise the same issue of mediators’ accountability for mediated out-
 
232. FEDERAL EMPLOYEE MEDIATORS GUIDE, supra note 4, at Federal Guidance Notes 1 to 
Standard I. 
233. Bush, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 199, at 24. 
234. Cooley, supra note 200, at 130. 
235. Shapira, Decision-Making in Mediation, supra note 137, at 956. 
236. See, e.g., FLORIDA RULES, supra note 91, R. 10.420(b)(4), at 112 (“A mediator shall . . . 
terminate a mediation entailing . . . unconscionability . . . .”); VIRGINIA STANDARDS, supra note 150, 
§ J (requiring mediators to withdraw if they “believe that manifest injustice would result if the agree-
ment was signed”); see also Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Trial: Guidelines for Ensuring 
Fair and Effective Processes, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1100 (1990) (“[M]ediators and judges must 
prevent parties from signing agreements that would be unconscionable under contract doctrine.”); Coo-
ley, supra note 200, at 130 (noting that mediators must withdraw and terminate the mediation if the 
resulting agreement is grossly inequitable, or based on false information); Kevin Gibson, Mediator 
Attitudes Toward Outcomes: A Philosophical View, 17 MEDIATION Q. 197, 209 (1999) (“[M[ediation 
should not endorse [unconscionable] agreements that would not be sanctioned by society.”); Maute, 
supra note 228, at 348–49  (“[T]he mediator must intervene to avoid patently unfair agreements” and 
“should refuse to finalize an agreement . . . where the agreement is so unfair that it would be a miscar-
riage of justice.”); Shapira, Fairness, supra note 117, at 336 (“Mediators would be accountable for an 
outcome to the extent that mediation rules or other external obligatory rules—i.e., rules of law and 
morality—require them to take an action with respect to a mediation outcome.”). 
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comes, sometimes referred to as accountability for substantive fairness or out-
come fairness.237   
The idea that mediators have outcome accountability is shared by many 
mediation experts.  Lawrence Susskind, for example, argued that mediators of 
environmental disputes should ensure that mediated agreements take into ac-
count the interests of third parties238 and that mediators have an obligation to 
the mediation profession to ensure that mediation produces quality agreements 
that promote the reputation of the profession;239 Judith Maute claimed that 
court-connected mediators are accountable for the effect of mediation on public 
interests;240 Kevin Gibson argued that mediators sometimes have a duty to ques-
tion the mediated agreement, noting that “[w]here issues of harm to self or oth-
ers are involved, the mediator cannot be neutral in the sense of disinterested; he 
or she has an affirmative obligation to make sure that some kinds of settlement 
are questioned”;241 and Robert Baruch Bush and Joseph Folger have recently 
commented that “the dominant view in the field . . . [is] that substantive fairness 
of outcome is indeed one of the mediator’s key responsibilities.”242   
In a recent article on the meaning of fairness in mediation, I have added 
normative force to this “dominant view in the field” by pointing out the con-
nection between the accountability of mediators for outcome and their ethical 
duties towards the profession of mediation and the general public.  Focusing on 
the duty towards the profession, I argued that mediators must avoid conduct 
that would harm the profession, and therefore must take steps to prevent medi-
ation outcomes that might jeopardize the public’s confidence in mediation.  
This obligation, owed to the profession rather than the parties, mitigates the 
parties’ right to self-determination with the effect that the parties cannot relieve 
the mediator of that responsibility by agreeing on an illegal, unconscionable, or 
grossly unfair outcome.243  Moreover, on the basis of a mediators’ duty toward 
the public not to harm important social interests such as the rule of law and 
critical morality, I argued that mediators are required to take steps to prevent 
illegal and immoral outcomes even when they do not jeopardize the institution 
 
237. Maute, supra note 228, at 248. 
238. Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. 
REV. 1, 14‒18 (1981). 
239. Lawrence Susskind, Expanding the Ethical Obligations of the Mediator: Mediator Account-
ability to Parties Not at the Table, in WHAT’S FAIR: ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS 513, 516–17 (Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow & Michael Wheeler eds., 2004). 
240. Maute, supra note 228, at 358. 
241. Gibson, supra note 236, at 209. 
242. Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, Mediation and Social Justice: Risks and Op-
portunities, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 11 (2012). 
243. See Shapira, Fairness, supra note 117, at 324–27. 
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of mediation.244   
In view of the fact, then, that codes of conduct for mediators and mediation 
scholars alike recognize mediator accountability for outcomes, there is a strong 
basis for amending the Model Standards to offer a greater degree of accounta-
bility of mediators for mediation outcomes. 
 
III. CRITIQUE OF PARTICULAR STANDARDS 
The primary focus of Part II has been on major conceptual changes that the 
Model Standards should undergo: a change in the definition of mediation; an 
explicit extension of the application of the standards to mediation styles other 
than problem-solving mediation; a clearer statement and consistent application 
of the levels of guidance; an express recognition and statement of mediators’ 
duties other than their duties toward the parties, namely duties toward the pro-
fession, the public, and courts or referring bodies; inclusion of guidance on the 
event that standards conflict; a fundamental change in the current structure of 
the Model Standards through a deconstruction of the Standard of Quality of the 
Process and its replacement with new Standards of Diligence, Honesty, Re-
spect, Professional Integrity, and Fairness; and an open acknowledgement of 
mediators’ accountability for mediation outcomes.  The rest of the Article pro-
ceeds with a critical reading of particular standards, exposing defects in their 
content which merit changes of a more local nature.   
A. Self-determination 
The Standard of Self-determination suffers from several weaknesses that 
need to be addressed. 
 
1. No Clear Message on the Allocation of Decision-making Power 
between Parties and Mediators 
The Model Standards recognize an extensive right of mediation parties to 
“exercise self-determination at any stage of a mediation, including mediator 
selection, process design, participation in or withdrawal from the process, and 
outcomes.”245  At the same time the Standard of Self-determination provides 
that “a mediator may need to balance such party self-determination [on process 
design] with a mediator’s duty to conduct a quality process . . . .”246  It indicates, 
therefore, that the parties’ right to self-determination is not without limitations 
 
244. See id. at 329–34. 
245. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard I.A. 
246. Id. at Standard I.A.1. 
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and mediators will sometimes have a duty to intervene in (or balance) the par-
ties’ decision-making.   
The standard’s focus on process design seems to me to be wrong, because 
decisions on any mediation issue may require the mediator to intervene and 
frustrate the parties’ choice.  In fact, the Model Standards themselves illustrate 
that point in other standards, such as the Standards of Impartiality, Conflicts of 
Interest, and Confidentiality.  For example, according to the Standard of Impar-
tiality, mediators are not allowed to accept gifts and favors which raise a ques-
tion of impartiality (notwithstanding the parties’ wishes);247 the Standard of 
Conflicts of Interest provides that parties cannot select a mediator “[i]f a medi-
ator’s conflict of interest might reasonably be viewed as undermining the integ-
rity of the mediation,” thus imposing a limitation on mediator selection;248 and 
the Standard of Confidentiality recognizes that a mediator may be required by 
law to disclose mediation information even where the parties object to such 
disclosure.249  These are not process design decisions, yet the mediator legiti-
mately intervenes in (or balances) the parties’ decisions.  Moreover, as previ-
ously argued, mediators might have to intervene and terminate a mediation 
when the parties agree on an outcome which is illegal or unconscionable.250  
What is missing, therefore, from the current Standard of Self-determination is 
a general statement which explains when and on what grounds mediators are 
required to exercise balancing.251   
2. Failure to Incorporate Party Competency as a Component of Self-
determination 
As noted previously, party competency, in the sense of a capacity to per-
ceive information, understand it and participate in the mediation, is an im-
portant element of self-determination.252  At the moment, the Model Standards 
refer to party competency in the Standard of the Quality of the Process, treating 
it as an issue which is relevant to persons with disabilities, while I argue that it 
should be incorporated instead into the Standard of Self-determination as an 
integral part of exercising self-determination.253   
 
247. Id. at Standard II.B.2, 3. 
248. Id. at Standard III.E. 
249. Id. at Standard V.A. 
250. See supra Section II.G.2. 
251. See Shapira, Decision-Making in Mediation, supra note 137, at 940–44, 959 (discussing the 
meaning of balancing and suggesting a formulation of that concept). 
252. See supra Section II.F.2. 
253. See supra Section II.F.2. 
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3. Wrong Approach to Informed Consent  
As noted previously while discussing the accountability of mediators for 
mediation outcomes, the guidance on informed decision-making provided by 
the Standard of Self-determination is unsatisfactory.254  Mediators should be 
placed under a duty to conduct mediations under conditions that enable parties 
to make informed decisions, and the standard should clarify the circumstances 
in which mediators ought to terminate the mediation for lack of informed con-
sent.   
B. Impartiality 
The Standard of Impartiality requires extensive revision because its current 
wording presents an unrealistic picture of a normative concept of impartiality. 
1. Failure to Distinguish between Implicit and Explicit Bias 
Impartiality, according to the Standard of Impartiality, “means freedom 
from favoritism, bias or prejudice.”255  This definition is wrong because it does 
not differentiate between implicit and explicit favoritism and bias.  No one can 
be expected to be free of feelings and thoughts of favoritism, bias or preju-
dice.256  What can legitimately be expected of mediators is to refrain from ex-
ternal manifestations of favoritism or bias between parties in word or action.257  
Many codes of conduct for mediators capture this notion in their definitions of 
impartiality, providing that impartiality means “freedom from favoritism or 
bias in word, action, or appearance,”258 and so should the Model Standards.   
 
2. Ignoring the Full Implications of Perceived Partiality 
The Standard of Impartiality directs mediators to “conduct a mediation in 
 
254. See supra Section II.G.1. 
255. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard II.A. 
256. See SHAPIRA, supra note 19, at 212. 
257. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard II.A. 
258. FLORIDA RULES, supra note 91, R. 10.330(a), at 107 (emphasis added); see also TEXAS 
GUIDELINES, supra note 95, § 9 cmt ; MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE 
MEDIATION Standard IV.1 (SYMPOSIUM ON STANDARDS OF PRACTICE 2000), http://www.ameri-
canbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/family/reports/mediation.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HP2A-KKR7] [hereinafter FAMILY MEDIATION MODEL STANDARDS]; ALABAMA 
CODE, supra note 150, at Standard 5(a); GEORGIA STANDARDS, supra note 150, Standard III.A, at 
27. 
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an impartial manner and avoid conduct that gives the appearance of partial-
ity.”259  This requirement should be tied with a concept of reasonableness, fol-
lowing the example of the Standard of Conflicts of Interest, according to which 
we ask mediators to avoid conduct that might reasonably raise a question of a 
mediator’s impartiality.260  It should be clear that we cannot be satisfied with a 
merely subjective suspicion of partiality of the parties for the normative purpose 
of assigning ethical responsibility to mediators,261 although for practical (as op-
posed to ethical) reasons mediators would do better to avoid any subjective sus-
picion of partiality as well.  Thus, the Standard of Impartiality should be revised 
to guide mediators to avoid partiality and any conduct that might reasonably 
create the appearance of partiality.   
A second defect of the current Standard of Impartiality lies in its failure to 
treat the appearance of partiality as a ground for declining to accept a case and 
withdrawal.  The standard provides that “[a] mediator shall decline a mediation 
if the mediator cannot conduct it in an impartial manner,”262 and “[i]f at any 
time a mediator is unable to conduct a mediation in an impartial manner, the 
mediator shall withdraw.”263  This wording might be wrongly interpreted by 
mediators as leaving the question about impartiality completely in their hands, 
that is, dependent on their personal evaluation of their ability to conduct the 
mediation without favoritism or bias.  The better view is that impartiality, like 
conflicts of interest, must also be evaluated from a reasonable bystander’s point 
of view, in order to ensure that the integrity of mediation is not jeopardized and 
that public confidence in mediation is not undermined.  The Florida Rules, for 
example, state that “[a] mediator shall not accept or continue any engagement 
for mediation services in which the ability to maintain impartiality is reasona-
bly impaired or compromised.”264   
The Standard of Impartiality should therefore be redrafted to accommodate 
 
259. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard II.B. 
260. See, e.g., id. at Standard III.A, C, E. 
261. See, e.g., MEMBERS CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT art. 8(3) (FAMILY MEDIATION CAN.), http:/
/fmc.ca/sites/default/files/sites/all/themes/fmc/images-user/Members%20Code%20of%20Profes-
sional%20Conduct_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/QP86-7LRQ] (“The perception by one or both of the par-
ticipants that the mediator is partial does not in itself require the mediator to withdraw, but in such 
circumstances, the mediator must remind both parties of their right to terminate the mediation.”) [here-
inafter FAMILY MEDIATION CANADA CODE]. 
262. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard II.A. 
263. Id. at Standard II.C. 
264. FLORIDA RULES, supra note 91, Committee Notes to R. 10.330, at 107 (emphasis added); 
see also STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR N.Y. STATE CMTY. DISPUTE RESOLUTION CTR. MEDIATORS 
Standard II, cmt. 2 (N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS. DIV. OF PROF’L AND COURT SERVS. 2009), 
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/adr/Publications/Info_for_Programs/Standards_of_Conduct.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q7NH-YPG3].   
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this concern, conditioning the acceptance of cases and mandating a withdrawal 
in circumstances that raise a reasonable concern of partiality or an appearance 
of partiality that could undermine the institution of mediation and public trust 
in it.   
 
3. Failure to Distinguish between Legitimate and Illegitimate Favoritism 
The Standard of Impartiality places mediators under a duty not to favor one 
party over another (“freedom from favoritism”), but does not explain what that 
means and how it can be achieved in practice.265  A mediator could understand 
it to mean that parties should always be treated in the same manner, for exam-
ple, that parties should be allocated the same amount of time for relating their 
stories, or that where one party is met separately the other party should also be 
met separately.  However, the same treatment (or same mediator conduct) could 
have different effects on the parties.  For example, the mediator might provide 
the same information to both parties (for example, on the importance of their 
seeking legal advice) with the result that the information favors Party A (who 
is unaware of his or her legal rights).  To complicate matters even more, inac-
tion by the mediator could also favor one of the parties.  For example, in the 
previous example the decision not to provide the information might favor Party 
B.   
A realistic approach to impartiality must therefore take into account the re-
alities of everyday practice, address these issues, and offer mediators a complex 
yet plausible concept of impartiality that goes beyond the slogan “freedom from 
favoritism.”  Such a concept would recognize the inevitableness of favoritism, 
most notably in circumstances of an imbalance of power between the parties,266 
and seek to distinguish legitimate favoritism from illegitimate favoritism.   
In effect the Model Standards already embrace this idea in a limited way.  
Section VI.A.10 of the Standard of Quality of the Process, which has been men-
tioned previously in a different context, explicitly recognizes that mediators 
sometimes have to treat a party differently, when “a party appears to have dif-
ficulty comprehending the process, issues, or settlement options, or difficulty 
 
265. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard II.A.  
266. See, e.g., Weidner, supra note 5, at 566 (noting, in discussing concerns that remained unre-
solved by the MODEL STANDARDS, that 
most real world mediators when faced with an obvious power imbalance between 
the parties want to take some sort of action “to ensure that the power imbalance 
does not threaten the ability of the weaker party to assert his own opinions . . . 
and to participate fully in the mediation.”  However, under the still quite gener-
ally-phrased Standard II, that mediator would run the high risk of creating an 
appearance of partiality.). 
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participating in a mediation.”267  In such case, the Model Standards go on to 
provide, “the mediator should explore the circumstances and potential accom-
modations, modifications or adjustments that would make possible the party’s 
capacity to comprehend, participate and exercise self-determination.”268   
The Model Standards are not alone in this respect.  The Illinois Standards, 
for example, provide that “[t]he mediator . . . must attempt to defuse any ma-
nipulative or intimidating negotiating techniques utilized by either of the par-
ties”;269 the Family Mediation Canada Code provides that “[t]he mediator has 
a duty to ensure balanced negotiations and must not permit manipulative or 
intimidating negotiating tactics.  While mediators must be impartial towards the 
participants, impartiality does not imply neutrality on the issue of procedural 
fairness”;270 and the Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Me-
diation direct mediators in mediations involving domestic abuse to “take ap-
propriate steps to shape the mediation process accordingly.”271  In addition, ex-
tensive scholarship discusses the view that mediators need sometimes intervene 
to empower weak parties and support balanced negotiation.272   
It is submitted, therefore, that the Model Standards should explicitly ad-
dress the need for mediators to treat parties differently during a mediation, and 
guide mediators on the circumstances in which such treatment would be justi-
fied.273   
C. Conflicts of Interest 
1. A Partial Definition of a Conflict of Interest 
The Standard of Conflicts of Interest “defines a conflict of interest as a deal-
ing or relationship that undermines a mediator’s impartiality.”274  It provides 
that “[a] conflict of interest can arise from involvement by a mediator with the 
 
267. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.10.  
268. Id.  
269. ILLINOIS STANDARDS, supra note 70, at § VI.C. 
270. FAMILY MEDIATION CANADA CODE, supra note 261, at art. 9.4. 
271. FAMILY MEDIATION MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 258, at Standard X; see also ILLINOIS 
STANDARDS, supra note 70, at § I.F.; MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.B. 
272. See, e.g., James B. Boskey, The Proper Role of the Mediator: Rational Assessment, Not 
Pressure, 10 NEGOT. J. 367, 367 (1994); Bush, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 199, at 25‒26; Michael 
Coyle, Defending the Weak and Fighting Unfairness: Can Mediators Respond to the Challenge?, 36 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 625, 649 (1998); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for 
Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1592 (1991); Shapira, Fairness, supra note 117, at 304–10. 
273. In addition, as noted earlier while discussing the misguided use of levels of guidance in the 
MODEL STANDARDS in supra Section II.C., the Standard of Impartiality uses the levels of guidance 
“shall” and “should” inconsistently, and should be amended as suggested. 
274. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 12 (emphasis added). 
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subject matter of the dispute or from any relationship between a mediator and 
any mediation participant, whether past or present, personal or professional, 
that reasonably raises a question of a mediator’s impartiality.”275  The exclusive 
focus on impartiality misses an additional important aspect of conflicts of in-
terest: the possible preference of an interest of the mediator over the interests 
of all parties.  Such cases do not necessarily raise partiality concerns, but rather 
questions about the mediator’s commitment to his professional role and to the 
parties.   
For example, charging fees on an hourly basis constitutes a potential con-
flict of interest because the mediator has an incentive to drag out the mediation 
in order to maximize his remuneration.  Of course, we expect mediators to over-
come this temptation and act with professional integrity, that is, provide ser-
vices when these are needed and make decisions on the basis of professional 
considerations, but note that the major concern that the mediator might unjus-
tifiably prolong the mediation, thereby preferring his or her personal interest 
over the parties’ interest, is one of integrity rather than impartiality.   
Another example concerns a (possible) legal duty of the mediator to dis-
close mediation information to nonparticipants.  Unlike the previous example, 
which describes a corrupt mediator, here the mediator has a legal justification 
to act in a manner that conflicts with the parties’ interest to preserve the confi-
dentiality of the information.  The disclosure could undermine the mediator’s 
impartiality if the information adversely affects one party, but it could also ad-
versely affect the interests of all parties (if, for example, both parties agreed to 
commit a crime), thereby raising a question about the integrity of the process 
rather than the impartiality of the mediator.   
The point I am making is that a mediator’s conflict of interest may raise a 
concern regarding a possible preference of the mediator’s interest over the in-
terests of the parties (in addition to a concern regarding mediator partiality), 
and may arise from a duty to act in a particular way (in addition to an involve-
ment with the subject matter of the dispute or from relationship).  Mediators 
and mediation participants should be aware of such conflicts of interest and the 
Standard of Conflicts of Interest should reflect that in the definition of a conflict 
of interest.   
2. A Need to Externalize the Rationale of a Serious Conflict of Interest 
The Model Standards, like other codes of conduct for mediators,276 refer in 
effect to two types of conflicts of interest: “minor” conflicts of interest that on 
 
275. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard III.A. 
276. See, e.g., FLORIDA RULES, supra note 91, Committee Notes to R. 10.340, at 107. 
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disclosure to the parties and reception of their consent do not prevent the medi-
ator from proceeding with the mediation, and “serious” conflicts of interest that 
“might reasonably be viewed as undermining the integrity of the mediation,”277 
in which case the “mediator shall withdraw from or decline to proceed with the 
mediation regardless of the expressed desire or agreement of the parties to the 
contrary.”278  This language is unsatisfactory because it leaves doubt as to the 
meaning of “the integrity of mediation” and as to the reason why the integrity 
of mediation should be preserved, thereby reducing the utility of such guidance 
to mediators.   
The Reporter’s Notes are more instructive on these points.  They explain 
that the Model Standards “retains content and language of the 1994 Version 
that notes that if the conflict of interest casts serious doubts on process integ-
rity, then the mediator shall decline to proceed despite the preferences of the 
parties,”279 and further note that the Joint Committee which drafted the Model 
Standards wanted to emphasize that “mediator conduct that raises questions of 
conflicts of interest serves to undermine public or party confidence in the cen-
tral integrity of the process.”280   
I think that a better way to describe a process of mediation which lacks 
integrity would be to use terms such as a “faulty” or “defective” process, and 
that the type of fault or defect that mandates mediator withdrawal should be 
described as one that “might undermine public trust in the profession and pro-
cess of mediation.”  I suggest that the rephrased Standard of Conflicts of Inter-
est should provide that where the conflict of interest raises a concern that the 
mediator will not be able to avoid harming a party’s interest, and as a result the 
mediation might be publicly perceived as faulty, thereby undermining public 
trust in the profession and process of mediation, the mediator shall decline to 
proceed despite the preference of the parties.   
 
D. Competence 
The Standard of Competence suffers from two major defects: it does not 
adequately define competence, and it sends a wrong, subjective message on the 
level of competence required of mediators, which is inconsistent with the Re-
porter’s Notes on competence.   
The Standard begins by stating that “[a] mediator shall mediate only when 
 
277. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard III.E. 
278. Id. 
279. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 13 (emphasis added). 
280. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
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the mediator has the necessary competence to satisfy the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties,”281 and continues with a declaration that “[a]ny person may 
be selected as a mediator, provided that the parties are satisfied with the medi-
ator’s competence and qualifications.”282  This seems to be a peculiar and shaky 
criterion for professional competence.  Would you, for example, define a law-
yer’s, or a doctor’s, or a judge’s competence by reference to his or her clients’, 
or his or her patients’, or the disputants’ expectations and satisfaction with his 
or her competence and qualifications?   
Clearly, different criteria are needed, and the first thing to note is that while 
the Model Standards refer again and again to “necessary competence,” they do 
not in fact define competence.  They do, however, provide two hints regarding 
“necessary competence,” by stating that “[t]raining, experience in mediation, 
skills, cultural understandings and other qualities are often necessary for me-
diator competence,”283 and by commenting that “[a] person who offers to serve 
as a mediator creates the expectation that the person is competent to mediate 
effectively.”284  It is worth noting that these observations focus on the role of 
mediators and on the process they conduct.  The definitions and existence of 
the role of mediators and the process of mediation are professional matters, 
largely independent of the parties’ wishes and expectations.  The parties’ 
wishes and expectations can affect and shape a mediator’s role and a mediation 
process to some extent, but a certain core of knowledge, skills, and practice will 
always remain fixed, as it is with respect to lawyers, doctors, and judges.   
I would argue that basic competence in mediation is a state of having the 
knowledge and skills necessary for carrying out the role of a mediator in an 
effective way, which will ordinarily require training and experience.  One will 
be able to learn more about this basic competence from the definitions of me-
diation and of the role of mediators that the Model Standards adopt,285 from the 
content of mediation training courses that have become more and more stand-
ardized,286 and from the representations a particular mediator makes to the par-
ties.  I do not suggest that the Standard of Competence should actually list the 
knowledge and skills expected of mediators.  However, what should become 
clear is that mediators’ competence is necessarily a matter beyond the parties’ 
 
281. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at IV.A. (emphasis added). 
282. Id. at Standard IV.A.1 (emphasis added). 
283. Id. (emphasis added).  
284. Id. (emphasis added). 
285. See supra Section II.A. (discussing the definition of mediation). 
286. See, e.g., MEDIATION TRAINING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES (FLA. SUP. CT. 
2013), http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/clerk/adminorders/2013/AOSC13-41.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5WB5-R5KZ]; GUIDELINES FOR THE TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION OF COURT-
REFERRED MEDIATORS (VA. SUP. CT. 2011), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin/aoc/djs/pro-
grams/drs/mediation/training/tom.pdf [https://perma.cc/XN4D-73JB]. 
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wishes and expectations, and that a Standard of Competence must aim at pro-
tecting the institution of mediation and the public, as well as the interests of the 
parties.   
Unlike the Model Standards, the Reporter’s Notes that accompany them 
make this point explicitly, stating that “to promote public confidence in the in-
tegrity and usefulness of the process and to protect the members of the public, 
an individual representing himself or herself as a mediator must be committed 
to serving only in those situations for which he or she possesses the basic com-
petency to assist.”287  This emphasis is lost in the current wording of the Stand-
ard of Competence, with its focus on the parties’ expectations and satisfaction, 
and it should be reworked to include a definition of competence which is not 
satisfied with the parties’ wishes.   
   
E. Confidentiality 
Several issues should be addressed in reforming the Standard of Confiden-
tiality.   
1. Lack of Guidance on Limitations on Disclosure of Information with 
Parties’ Consent 
The Standard of Confidentiality correctly conditions disclosure of media-
tion information by the mediator, which is not sanctioned by law, on the agree-
ment of the parties.  It provides that “[i]f the parties to a mediation agree that 
the mediator may disclose information obtained during the mediation, the me-
diator may do so.”288  However, this permissive language might be wrongly 
interpreted by mediators as a free license to disclose information with the par-
ties’ consent when in fact this is not the case.  The Standard of Confidentiality 
should, of course, be read and interpreted in light of all the obligations media-
tors are subject to, which might, as we have already seen, defeat the parties’ 
expressed desires.289  A mediator might not be allowed to disclose information 
notwithstanding the parties’ wishes if doing so would be inconsistent with the 
other standards and undermine the institution of mediation and public trust in 
it.  For example, if disclosure would lead outsiders to question the impartiality 
of the mediator in the conduct of the mediation, the mediator should not dis-
close the information despite the parties’ agreement because the mediator has a 
duty to protect the institution of mediation.  Thus, the grounds for permitted 
 
287. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 14 (emphasis added). 
288. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard V.A.1. 
289. See supra Section II.D. 
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disclosure290 should be qualified.   
2. A Partial Statement on the Discussion of the Extent of Confidentiality 
with the Parties 
Section V.C of the Standard of Confidentiality provides that “[a] mediator 
shall promote understanding among the parties of the extent to which the par-
ties will maintain confidentiality of information they obtain in a mediation.”291  
This section, the Reporter’s Notes observe, “targets a mediator’s responsibility 
to make certain that the parties understand the extent to which they, not the 
mediator, will maintain confidentiality of information that surface[s] in media-
tion.”292  What is clearly missing is a reference to the mediator’s responsibility 
to make certain that the parties understand the extent to which the mediator will 
maintain confidentiality.   
Parties should know the extent of their mediator’s duty of confidentiality if 
they are to be able to exercise self-determination regarding participation in the 
mediation and regarding the type of information they can safely share with the 
mediator, knowing that it will not be disclosed.  The California Rules, for ex-
ample, provide that “[a]t or before the outset of the first mediation session, a 
mediator must provide the participants with a general explanation of the confi-
dentiality of mediation proceedings,”293 and the Family Mediation Canada 
Code provides that “[t]he mediator shall inform the participants at the outset of 
mediation of the limitations to confidentiality and the fact that confidentiality 
cannot be guaranteed.”294   
The information provided by the mediator need not be a detailed account of 
the law of confidentiality which applies to mediation in his or her jurisdiction.  
After all, the mediator is not the parties’ lawyer and need not be a lawyer him- 
or herself.  However, the mediator must ensure that the parties have a general 
understanding of the extent of confidentiality which applies to him or her and 
to the process, in particular the fact that the protection of confidentiality might 
not be absolute and that disclosures might be permitted or even required in cer-
tain circumstances.  The mediator could involve the parties’ representatives (if 
they have any) in this process, or recommend that they consult an outside pro-
fessional on this matter.295   
 
290. See MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard V.A.2, 3. 
291. Id. at Standard V.C (emphasis added). 
292. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 16 (emphasis added). 
293. CALIFORNIA RULES, supra note 95, at R. 3.854(b). 
294. FAMILY MEDIATION CANADA CODE, supra note 261, at art. 7.3; see also id. at art. 11.1(c). 
295. An additional modification has been noted previously while discussing the misguided use 
of levels of guidance in the MODEL STANDARDS.  See discussion supra Section II.C (The Standard of 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The introduction of the Model Standards in 1994 and their reform in 2005 
have been important steps in the professionalization of mediation, contributing 
to the advancement of ethical conduct in the practice of mediation.  The stand-
ards were designed “to serve as fundamental ethical guidelines” for mediators, 
inform mediation parties, and “promote public confidence in mediation as a 
process for resolving disputes.”296  The critical analysis of the Model Standards 
in this Article has been carried out with the aim of furthering these goals.  With 
these purposes in mind, the Article has suggested conceptual changes and more 
targeted modifications of particular standards that if accepted will radically al-
ter the scope, structure, and content of the Model Standards.   
The Article argues that new and reformed Model Standards will supply me-
diators with a better understanding of their ethical obligations, and with clearer 
and more consistent guidance on ethical decision-making and ethical conduct.  
Moreover, once reformed, the Model Standards will better inform mediation 
participants on what can be expected of mediators in the course of mediation, 
and further enhance public confidence in the process and profession of media-
tion.   
The Article is intended to stir up discussion on the need to develop and 
adopt new Model Standards, and on their shape and content.  I hope it will 
stimulate the mediation community to begin a process of reforming the Model 
Standards, by having provided insights on conceptual and particular required 
amendments.   
 
Confidentiality, it has been observed, uses the levels of guidance “shall” and “should” inconsistently, 
and should be amended as suggested.). 
296. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at pmbl. 
